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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UPTOWN APPLIANCE & RADIO COM-
pANY, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LELAND B. FLINT, FLINT DISTRIBUT-
ING COMPANY, a corporation, REED 
BIGELOW, THE PARIS COMPANY, a 
corporation, E. M. ROYLE COMPANY, 
INCORPORATED, a corporation, and 
ROBERT NEVINS, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
ZION'S COOPERATIVE MERCANTILE 
INSTITUTION, a corporation, GRAY-
BAR ELECTRIC COMPANY, a cor-
poration, ORVIL J. COON, dba DAR-
LING APPLIANCE DEPARTMENT, 
FRANK WARREN, doing business as 
WARREN RADIO COMPANY and 
SALT LAKE HARDWARE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendants. 
APPELLANTS' B.RIEF 
Civil No. 
715:9·5 
This appeal is taken ftorr 'the p~urpos!e of reversing 
an ·order of the tri·al eourt which Siet aside the Vle·rdict 
of a jury and granted a new trial as to these appellants. 
Grounds upon which we :seek reV!e·rsal of the trial 
court's order are set forth in the petition ulplon which 
this app'eal was granted. 
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IThe record of the trial helu!W IS now before the 
court. It includJe,s, :in addition ·to unusually voluminous 
ple~~dings, more than 100 exhihilts and over 2,000 page.s 
of trial p·ro~eedings. Becaus:e we believe, and now 
urge, inter alia, tha't the trial eourt should have granted 
our serve-ral motions to ·dismis:s which were, made ·after all 
p~arties had resteid, the eourt is -confronted by the· glOiomy 
prospect of examining the ·entire· rle:C!ord. B·ut we most 
earnestly pre,ss as valid a number of points which may 
be cornsidere!d :and dispo:s.e·d of upon much l~ess than 
a full review of the entir1e1 record. For instance, we will 
contend herein that the order 1of the trial court s~ertiing 
aside the jury's verdict and granlting ·a new trial as to 
these deflendants shows. upon its face that it is invalid-
thrut it refi.e~ts a usurpation 'Of power nort Vlested in the 
trial court fby the ~Sitatutes or the aJpplicaJble rules of 
civil procedure.. It will be remembered that thi:s case 
was tried in 19·50, ·an~d its. trial was goiVerned by the 
new Utah Rules of :Civil Procedure. 
;The case was tried before the Honorab~e Joseph 
G. J epp~son and a jury. Trial 'began 10n January 3, 
1'950, and p;rroc~eded from day 1to day tlrereafter until 
F'ebruary 4, 1950, when :the ·case was. 1suhm:itileid to the 
jury. 1The verdict was unanimous in favor of ~all defend-
ants. On February 16, 19'50, pJaintiff filed its motion 
for a new trial. On Sl~pltember 5, 19·50, th-e Judge made 
his order d!enying the motion for n1ew trial as to Graybar 
Electric Comp~any, Z. C. M. I. and S·alt Lake' Hardware 
Comp·any, and gran1ting the motion as to Roiberlt Nevins, 
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R·eed C. Bigelo,v-, L·elan:d B. Flint, Flint Dis~tributing 
Compan:y, E. 1\I. Boyle Company and 1Tlte p,a,ris Com-
pany. 
~STATEMENT ·OF F kCTS 
Plaintiff is Uptown Ap!pliance and Radi!o Company, 
Inc. It was organized in 1947 to engage: in the r~e~tail 
sale 'Of electrical appliances in !Sialt Lake 'City. The busi-
ness ;was conceived in the min.ds of Briant ·s,. Badger, 
Ralph 0. Bradley ;and J~ean W. McDonough. The rleeord 
does nott show that any ·of 'them had ever had any sub-
stantial business ·ex!perience. We mention this :becaus~e 
the record will snow fuat any ibusinless ·difficulties. which 
OVJertook them were of their own making, 'and is in no 
sense -chargeable to any of thes.e app·ellants (;Tr. 2'129, 
1675, 1676). 
In th·e early fall :of 1947, Bradley, Badger and 
McDonough agr1eed to 'enter upion the retail appJianc:e, 
business as co-parltners; (Tr. 680). In the fiormative 
stages 10f 'their 'business they recognized their own lack 
of ·exp1erience ;and sens·ed the neeessity of assnciating 
with themselves som·eone who f~Jou.l!d bring to the. ente:r-
prise siome 'knowle:dge of fisical control 'and accounting. 
A·ccordingly, they invited Leland B. Tanner to p'artici-
pate wiJth them. :Tanne!r, like 'themselves, w;as without 
substantial !busriness 'experience, so fiar as the re:cord 
shorws. ·The:ve is nothing to indicate that he ever had any 
experience in the 'Operation of a retail bu:sinJe1s:s; 'but he 
had :for som~time ibeen emp~loyed by Wells., Baxte~r an~d 
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Miller, a firm of Certifiled Public Accountants CT'r. 1563). 
The partnership· 'idea was dis·ca;rded and the plaintiff 
corporation was organized in 1'947 (Tr. ,680) with B'adger 
as P'~esident, Bradley as Vice President, and T'anner as 
Secr!Htary and ·Treasurer. Bradley, Badger, T·ann-er and 
McDonough and their res1peetive wives ·e$h subscri!bed 
I $2,000.00 ·to make up the firm's total capital of $16,000.00. 
It is interesting an!d imporltant to note that McDonorugh 
and Bradley never paid in quite thle· full amount of their 
subscriptions (Tr. 1431). Financi~al statements there-
after ma:de rby the plaintiff to its creditors ·concealed the 
fa0t tha;t there was any dJeficiency in p~aid-in capital. 
The amount of unpaid capital subscriptions were in-
chided in' '.~ccounts receivable'' (Exhibits j50 ·and 51; Tr. 
1448, 1449). 
At any rate, plaintiff hegan· its corp01rate life wilth 
somethnl'g les:s than $16,000.00 ('Tr. 6:80). It elected to 
transact 1busines:s at 38 Sourth Main Stre~et in ·salt Lake 
City. 1That sp·ruce WaJs held under lease hy the op~erator 
of a shoe shine parlor. T'O induCle~ the hoot black to vaCJate: 
the premiS'eS and make ro:om r01r plaintiff's rup:pliance 
s:to·re, plaintiff was required to p~ay $3,000.00 ( Tr. 681, 
682). Rehalbilitation and ~decoration of the p·remises to 
make· them suitaJble~ for the app~liance 'business. requir~d 
the exp~enditure of 'approximately $4,000.00 (Tr. 811). 
It will he se'en, therefore, that 'approximately h'alf of 
plaintiff's capital was. sp:ent herore it acquirred a stock 
of goods and o~pene'd its place ·for ~business. :That fact is 
important as be~aring urp1on the good faith nf plaintiff's 
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case, and is significant wh·en considered in conn·ecttion 
''~ th plaintiff's f a.ntastic demands as reflected in its 
prayer for damages. 
Before ·opening for business in Norvemhe-r, 1947, 
plaintiff made eonnootions 'vith certain Wh'Ole~salers. 'Other 
than those involved in this case, as the result of which 
it was a:ble to stock its store with various electrical 
appliances. :The store was !Oipen~d for trade at the1 ·end 
of NoiVern!ber, 1947 (Tr. 6871;o 689). 
During the year ·of 1948, plaintiff secured :franchises 
or other autlrorization from various distributors. fior 
the sale of certain of their products at r~ail .at its. Main 
Stroot stoTe. Plaintiff began the purchase of Easy Wash-
ers from Z. C. M. I., Bendix and Klelvinator appHJ~ees 
and Zenith radios from Flint Distributing ,Comp:any, 
Hotpoint appliances from Graybar Electric Comp·any, 
and RCA radios from Glenn Earl Distributing ~Com­
~pany. Later in 1948 it began the p~urchaS'e of phonograp1h 
records : Columbi'a reco~d:s. ftom Flint Distri.Jbuting ·C'om-
pany, RCA records from Glenn Earl Dis1tributing Com-
pany, D·eooa records from Salt Lake Hardware ·C1om-
pany, and othe-r recoTdB from oth·e:r distributors. llt 
should fbe noted that when p~aintiff made ilts cormeeti'Ons 
with Z. ~c .. M. I., Flint Distri!buting Comp,any, Salt L1ake 
Hardware and GI"ayibar Electric 'C:omp;any, its only p~l:ace 
of lbusines~s. was at 38 S:outh M·ruin ~Street. !S!ale of appli-
anees !by pJaintiff at any ·o'ther p~l$e was not then in the 
contemplation 'of th·e p;arties. No claim was made upon 
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the- tri1al that any 'Of thb1se c'Ompanies was under any 
agreement or !Oiblig~ti:on ito continue for any length o.f 
time to furnish merchandise to p~aintiff for resale. 
Plaintiff claimed that the· wholeS'alers menrtinn.e:d coul\d 
not !:awfully dis(~Jontinue s:ale to it as the result nrf any 
conce~rted action or conspiracy. 
W·e paus·e •to ~deseribe briefly the com1pe1Jitive fi~·ld 
upon which plaintiff 1a~che:d its business .. Wlren pJain-
tiff located at ·38 ·South M;ain Street it found its,elf almost 
next door to the Warren Radro Ciomp:any, which was 
and h~d bre·en :doing busmes.s at 128 S:outh Main Street 
for many years. Plaintiff was d!irootly across the stre~et 
from Z. C:. M. I. where ·a retail ap~pliance 'business had 
been carried nn :Eor many years. The fact is that upon 
Main s:treet i8Jt that time thlere were not leiSS than fifteen 
retail appliance stores ( T'r. 2020, 2021). It is als.o a 
faet thrut ~at th~rut time th·ere were 3'2'3 retail apf)Jiance 
stores in 1S:alt L!Rke ·City 1and vicinity (Tr. 19·33, 1934). 
Under--capitalized ·an!d 'DiVer-mailllJeod as plaintiff wrus, 
it seemed to he, going along in a noirmal wa;y until it made 
its unfortUIUate association wilth Glenn Erarl. E:arl held 
the 'ilis:rihutorshlp, for RadtiJo Ciorporation of America 
produeits in Utah, Idaho and :a part of .O;regon. He 
effected distribution of RCA lpirlodU:cts in that wide, area 
; 
through :aeaJe·rs. whom he sHlecte;d ~and licensed or other-
wise aurthorizerd itJOI distribute his p~oducts in ther several 
communritjjes in whieh th:ey idi!d business. He rbought mer-
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chandise directly from RCA, ·and resold it to ·de,alers 
"~hon1 he had selected. The number of de,alers a.uth!olrized 
by hrim to 'Sell RCA radios and rooords totall~d 175 ('Tr. 
673.). 
In the spring of 1948 Earl discoV1ered that he had 
critically over bought from the manufootur-e:r and wa:s 
facing financial di·saster. He had in stock 300 to 3'50 
high-p~ced consol·e radios which were aJb'out to become 
Obsolete. They were the 610-V1 modJel much talked 
aJbout ·during the trial.. T'O use lris, language upon the 
witness stand, E-arl ' 'could not ·eat'' thos·e old models. 
He "was stuck with them" and "had to shake them 
off'' 'Or face ruin (Tr. 622, 6:23). 
E~arl importuned all 'Of his 175 dealers to take some: 
of his outmoded merchan!dise. 'T;hey all refus:e:d--iall but 
plaintiff. Pl'aintiff was Earl's only '·'taker" and he 
wo~ked off his entire S'tock upion plaintiff (Tr. 62'3). 
Plaintiff was thus victimiz!ed b·y Earl arrd was ror~ed to 
businJess praCJtices which ~degraded the tr~de, nHme of 
RCA and other comp·ert:.ing p:rO'ducts purchased from 
other distributors by the p·lafutiff. 
As fast as Earl passed on ·610-V1 models to pJain-
tiff, he p:assed to p]ruintiff the necessity of working off 
obsolete merchandise 'Or 'being ' 'stuck'' with it. .A!eco1r'd-
ingly, p·lain!tiff began J1e:sioT'ting to rrudio mystery tunes, 
guessing games. a.nd the 1promiscuous giving away 'of 
gift -certificates to induce p,eiopJe to huy ('Tr. 701 to 711). 
M·eam.while, E~arl, in keep·ing with RCA policy, refused 
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to :allow -any other dealer in BJCA radios to advertise 
RC:A radlols at !Rrny discount below retail p1rices. sug-
ges·terd hy him. Earl -siold RC·A radros. to N·evins and 
Royle: and other d~ealer1s. n'Ot pa~ties to this litigation. 
He required them to maintain ''list priee1s'' while p~ain­
tiff was J'leso;rting to all manne·r of discount s·chemes to 
work off the ohsol:erte: 6l0-V1 RCA radios upion the public 
('Tr. ~630). Dis-counting RCA radios naturally b(rought 
on di:s(~~ount biY pJJaintiff of the p:rice iof othe1r radios., 
including Zenith. And, 'Of ~our's·e, disCJountJing one moidle1 
RCA ramo maide it difficult for any dooleT to m-arintain 
list p~rice-s on other mo1dels. 
During 'the summer 'and fall of 1948, ·dea1e;rs N~evins 
('Tr. 6·2:9) and Royle (Tr. '6i32') comp,laineld to Earl an~ 
toJ~d htim that th·ey must he pe;rmitted to adverlis·e dis-
counts 'as l'ong as the' practice p;ersisted at pla~ntiff's 
S'tore. ·O'rvil ·Coon, another ·d~al1er (Tr. ·6·34) ·dealing in 
RCA radios, :i.niormed Earl that he w<YUld he fiorced to 
'Wdvertis~e RC'A rladios~ rut a ·diseount if he was to moV1e 
his -stock rof mer·cJhandis;e. E:arl',s, answer wa:s that deal-
ers tC~ould niot dis-count; that they had refus'e'd to buy tJhe 
otbs1olete 610-V1 1anJd would have to mainJtruin list ~ri:ce1s 
upon the RCA merehoodJis1e which they ·had pu.rohas·ed 
(Tr. 6:30). 
In the early rail of 1948, p·~ainttiff installed a rooo:rd 
l 
~deplar'tment and ·acquir1e'd ·the right from Earl to r~ail 
RCA :rooor'ds. In November 1948, Earl entered up,on a 
'' F~air ·T'rade'' !ag!1eement with Rofbert Nevins co:ve:ri.ng 
RCA recoirds '(!T'r. ·637, 11'2~, 1125, Exhilhit Q:O'). 
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The Fair Tra:de agre:ement was duly regis,tered 'vith 
the Trade Commission of trhe State of Utah ion November 
30, 1948 (Tr. 11'25; Ex. PP), 'an!d thereupon it bocame 
unla·wful for any retailer to sell RCA re!cords. at p1rices. 
belo1v tlros-e fixed in ·the trade agreement (Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, Title 16A, Chap~ter 3). 
In December plruintiff began the sale of F·air 'Traded 
R:CA records ·art; ia twenty per ·cent discount. That was 
done to attradt business and 'Stimulate sal~e of ofue,r 
merchandise in plruintiff's Sitore. Plaintiff's sale of RCA 
records at a discount was ·soon hrought to the att·e~ntion 
of other RCA ·dea1er.s. 1by their -customers·.· ··Other de·alers, 
including T·he Paris Company (Tr. 1076), Z. C. M. I. 
('T·r. 9'99), and Bigelow (Tr. 99'2) confirmed th·e s.ale 
by plaintiff of RC·A records at ·a discount hy causing 
purchases to be maJde at plaintiff's :store. Naturally, 
dealers wh'ose shelves were s:tocked with reco:rds which 
could not be 1discormted to comp1ete with identical rner-
·chandise off.elied by plaintiff eornplained to Earl ('Tr. 
591) and insisted that something be do:ne to eliminate 
the comJp,etitive advantage ·enjnyed by plaintiff through 
violation of the Fair 'Trrude ~agreement. That ·is hoiW 
and why The P~aris Comp,any ~and Bigelow became in-
volv~d in '<~ontro:v:ersy with E~arl. They in:sistted that 
E:arl stop vioJ:ation of . the Fair 'Trade agr·e:ement 
by pJaintiff, or p1e~rmit them to dis[count. ·They gave 
Earl the alternative· of rebuying the stocks they had on 
hand ·(~Tr. 5~91 to 606·). 
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In November, 1'948, plaintiff opiened ·a store 'On State 
Street ur1der the name of Radio Cicy. Flint DistriJbuting 
Company -authorize1d plaintiff to ·slell Kelvinator and B;en-
dix produc:ts, an!d Zenith radios, and certain other pr:o~­
ducts at thrut s't1ore ( Tr. 18'9'2'). In D-ecemhe,r, 1948, p·lain-
tiff le~sed s.pace 'On Pierpont Street, in th·e warehouse 
district of 'S,alt Lake 'City, and ·thJe,re !began the s'ale of 
all typ~e·s of merclrandis.e !BJt heavy discount to certam 
large group·s of industrial and commercilal employees 
('Tr. 72·3 to 7 42) . 
On D!ooember 13, 19'48 ( Tr. 18319), Bradley, B'aldger, 
MeD1onough 1and :T·anner met at the office of Flinlt Dis .. 
tributing 'C'ompany wfuth Lelan'd B. Flint and his ~depart­
ment heads :and ~e!rtain ·othe:r ernlp1oyees. It is without 
dispute rtlrrut the first p~a:rlt of that ~conference was, devoted 
to ;a friendly idiscussion of Kelvinator p~odudts. Flint 
was urging praintiff 's repreS'entatives to purch'ruse a 
large s:tock ·of ~elvlliator ice boxes and other p·roducts 
('Tr. 1840, 755, 101J5). There is a dispute in the record 
as 1to wh!at was dJiseussed foHoiWing the refietrences to 
Kelvilra tor. Plrui:ntiff 's rep·res.e;ntatives testified thaJt 
Fi:hrt ito~d them that tbJerir discounting p;ractices were 
getting them in tr'ouhle, 1an!d 1tha1t unles's they chang~d 
the:ir ways they would he ·destroye!d ('T'r. 75·6). They 
~luirge Flint with s1talting th:at !a;t thalt very time -a meet-
ing ·Was hieing held in 'S!alt Lake C]ty at which p·laintiff''s 
£rute was to he settled ( Tr. 7;57). AeCJolrding to- them, 
Flint s1tated 'that the p~~r.sotn;s /then convening to s·ettle 
plaintiff's £alte were the manager'S of s:oultiheast Furni-
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turte Company, The Paris Company, Z. C. M. I., an1d 
Gus P. B·ackman, Executive SooretaJry of S~alt Lake. City 
Chamber of Commerce {Tr. 757). Flint 'and all of his 
ass·ociates denied that Flint haJd ever referre1d to :any 
such meeting, or that lue had ever "told p·laintiff 's repre-
sentaJtives tlrat 1p~aintiff was ·a:boill!t to be de:Stroyed ( Tr. 
1846, 1847). That nJo meeting of p:ers·ons rep·re·sentmg 
·Southeast FurnituTe 'Company (T:r. 1793.), \T·he Paxi:s 
Company ('Tr. ·2111), Z. ·C. M. I. (Tr. 2'119') and Gus P. 
B1aclrman (·Tr. 1787) was ever hJe,ld was es:tafbJishe·d with-
out dispute by the testimony of each of the~ p·e:rtsons refeT·-
red to. 
On 'Or about D·ecember 15, 1948, L·eland B. Flint 
learne'd of the war~eh<>use 'operarbions being carried otn hy 
the plaintiff on Pierpont ·Street ·(Tr. 1850). His rep:re-
S'entatives infiormed plaintiff that p~aintiff would no:t he 
allowed to distribute Bendix ('Tr. 1'96·6·, 19·68) or Kelvin-
artor ('T'r. 1805) prioducts through the PiJe1rp;ont wrur'e-
house, but would ibe permitte·d to continue the s'ale of 
Zenith radios and CiOlmnfbiJa rooords: ( Tr. 1154). There-
upon, plaintiff told Flint that it did not trust him and 
that if plaintiff pould not S'ell 'as it pleaJs:.ed all ·of the 
I 
lines distri!bute·d !by Flint, i>Jailltiff wan1:Je·d none of his 
line ('Tr. 770). P~aintiff 'arranged to relturn to Flint 
all mercha.n!dis-e then on bJand and ·theretofore pur~ehased 
from him, and to receive cr~dit fior such mer'chandise 
:against th1e· large ·balance owing Flint (Tr. 1807). 
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·On D·ecember 17, 19~8, Flint called upon Ha;:roJd 
H. Benne1tt, V~ce P:restident and General Man·ager of 
Z. C. M. I., .and ·s~poke 'briefly about the typ·e of op·era;tion 
carri:e~d on by p·lain!tiff 'rut th!e Pierp.ont warehouse. On 
that ·occasion Flint 'e)Chi!hiteid ·to Bennett one of tlre caTds 
employed fby p·laintiff in ialdvertising it::; warehJofU!S·e op;era-
tion on Pierponlt ~street. Early in January, ·afte!r Flint's 
me~rchJandise ·haJd heeu returned 'to him hy plaintiff, and 
·after Z. ·C. M. I. b!ad dis!ConJtinued the 'S'ale ·of Easy 
Washers. 'to p~lruinrbiff, Flint was :again in Bennett's office. 
That mee!ting wrus most 1brief. Flint s:aid, ''Mr. Bennett, 
I under1stand yoru. are not ge1tting along ve·ry well with 
Uptown Ap·p·liance. Is that right~'' Bennett's reply was, 
'' ·Tha;t is righ!t.'' Thlat wa:s the eJCtent of the conversation 
between Flintt 1and -BHnnetJt CT·r. 1853:, 1854) . Thos'e· brief 
·convers~aJtions between FEnt and B·ennett were seized 
u1pon hy ~the p•laintiff as the geDle's:is. of ~the alleged con-
spiracy. F'o:r s1ometime p:rior to the 17th 'Of Deeember, 
19·48, eompl'ain1ts hald been reaching Mr. B·ennett f·rom 
his !dep~artmen.t helakLs ·to the ~eff•eet that the trade prac-
tices of plaiin.tiff, .a,s they related to Easy Washe':vs., we,re 
diseredritmg that ·CJommodity in the market (;Tt. 980, 
983). Benneltt ther'eifor1e, ~decided to diseo~tinue the 'S'ale 
of Easy Washers to p·laintiff Mtil p·laintiff. should rudopt 
a method of :advertising ~and iSiale of Easy Washers in 
harmony with Mr. B enn:e1tt 's notiions of 'SIOflilld me1rchan-
disring ('T'r. 98H, 987). 
By the first week in Jianuary, 19'49·, there was a 
general re'sentment 'amorrg ·retaile~r's of RCA 'records, who 
were re!Strained by the F1ai!r !T:raide law from comp·eiting 
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with plaintiff. On J~anuary 5, 1949, Jules ·S. Drey:Dou~s, 
\·"ice Presidelllt of The Paris ·Comp~any, invited retailers 
of RCA records -to meet at the Ho1tel Utah. Such a meet-
ing was held and those pres:ent were E. M. Royle·, Mr. 
Holland, ·a repre~sent·ative· of Glen Broth·ers Mus~c ·C:om-
pany, two representatives of Dtaynes Music Company, 
a reprresenfuJtive of Clark Radi1o Comp~any, Reed C. 
Bigelow, Harold H. Benneltt of Z. C. M. I., and two rep-
res·entativ8ls of 'The P:aris Company. The: su!hject of dis-
cussion was the sale of phoillograph recor1ds in viol~ti'On 
of the Fair T'rade laws. A. H. Nebeker, a memfber of 
the Bar, and ·at:torney ror The Paris ~C:ompany and 
Z. C. M. I., was. called in to .advis~e~ those pre,s:ent. He 
told them thrut there was danger in coneeiflted action, 
and th~t the -state should police the Fair 'T;rade law. 
The meeting thereup·on tbroke up· (Tr. 989 to- 99·6). 
Dfleyfous, ·of 'The p:a;ri.Js ·C1ompany, to;ok the ma;tter up 
with the Trade Ciorrumssion, :aJl!d therearter a leltt~r 
wa1s written hy the Secretary of the Trade· C'Om:rni!S1sion 
to P1lainti.ff directing plailitiff to ceas~e violation of the 
E1air Trade a~eement ('T:r. 1480 to 1482, E:x:lribit 44). 
·The method used by plaintiff in the sale of RCA 
records wtrus rto sell a 1book for $20.00 which ~orrtaine:d 
I $25.00 worth of eorupons go1o1d for the purC!ha;s;e of plhono-
graph records. It was. ~sh!orwn tlrat such cou~p,on·s coi111:d 
be us·ed ~or the purchrus:e of Decca records and other 
reeords, ·rus well as RCA records (Tr. 1000, 13'54). When 
the man~ager :of Salt Lake H·a~dware le1ar'Il:ed 'of the 
coupon melth!old of priee dis-counting, he concluded that 
I 
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the value of his company's la1"ge inventory would he 
jeopardized hy sueh long ~term d.iseount, !and refused 
to :CoilJtinue the sail.e to plaintiff of Deooa records until 
the p'raetiee hrud ibHen ·diSf~Jontinu~d, and th·e effect o.f the 
corupon hooks h!aJd spent itself (iTir. 1919, 1'929, 1959). 
In Fehrnary 1949 G:r~a~-Ahar Electric :bejcame eon-
' ' JU t 
cerned aborult the credit ,sjtanding of p~aintiff and sug-
gested thlrut it c;oop1errute with p~aintiff in 'an effoirt to 
h:ave p~airrtiff ',s. me!r'ooandis:e '' fio,or p~lanned'' so ·as. to 
relieve plaintiff':s eredit situation.. Those efforts failed, 
an!d in February G:vaybar ·refused 'to sell Hotpomt mer-
chandis!e: lto ~~aintiiff ('Tr. 205·2 to 205·6·). 
On J'anll!ary 1~5, 1949, T!anner resigned f~om P'laintiff 
and resume:d :his emploiJIDent w:iJth W etls, Baxter and 
Miller. In May, 1949, p1aintiff turned OiVe'r its, lease 
at 38 'South M'ain S1treet to Bradle:y an'd ·Badger. ·Th01se 
two coDJtinued 1at thaJt place in the refuil app1liance 
busine,ss under 'the name of B·mdley-Baldger ('Tr. 816, 
817). ·They were 'S'O iengaged at the time of the tri:al 
CTr. 82'5). 
In August, 19·49·, MeDonough took empiloyment with 
Glenn E:arl ~as :an app11±ance sruesm!an ('Tr. 1008, 1009). 
o:n Fehrua.ry 18, 1949, plaintiff brought this suit 
again:sft Le~a.Jl!d B. Flint; Flint Distr~buting ·Company, 
a ~corpo'r'ation; Ree:d Bigelow, The! Paris Comp'any, a 
corp:o:raltion; ·Graylbiar Electric IC:omplany, a ro'rporation; 
O·rvil J. C'Oion, domg ·business ~as Darling App~liance: 
D·e1plartmen.t; Zion ',s (Coop~er,ative Me~rcatttile Institution, 
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a corporation; E. :nr. Royle C:omp:any, Incorporate1d, ·a 
corpo·ration; Frank v"V·a:rren, dloting busineiSS aiS Warren 
Radio Coinpiany; Salt Lake Hardwa:re Company, ·a -cor-
poration; and Robert Nevins, claiming that they had 
conspiroo to fL"'C and maintain p~rices in the Salt Lake 
territo:ry on applianee's, ·radio instru1nent's and reco:r1ds, 
to limit the quantity and number 'Of ·such ~ar.ticlers to be 
sold, and to persu!alde, induce, en!t~ce and 1J.y thr,erats tio 
cut off the source of supply of merehandise: to the P'lain-
tiff, and ge'nel'lally to cause 'the ~destruction 'Of p~aintiff'iS: 
business (Tr. 1 to 15). Plaintiff, in its third amen!de'd 
complaint, upon which it went rtJo trial, claimed :actu'a:I 
damage in the sum of $443,347.67, and 1p1rayed fior tre:ble 
damages in the sum of $1,3:30,423..9'2 ( Tr. 46 to 5'5). 
At the close of the trial, 'anld 'after all the ·eiVidenee was 
in, plaintiff amended its ~ayer to -rre,duce its 'actual 
damage f}}om $443,347.67 to $200,000.00, ;aJl!d its p;rayer 
for tr~b~e 1damages from $1,330,423.92· to $.600,000.00 
('Tr. 2190). 
After p~rui.ntiff':s original complaint wrus ffied, nnme'r-
ous mo'tio·ns weTe l01dged in good 'time iaga:ins!t s1aid com-
plaint, 'as the result of which p~l·ain!tiff wa1s, requi~e,d to 
amen!d its ~ompillaint from time to time during 1949. 
I 
A~ter thH third 1amende1d comp~Iaint had heen filed, and 
motions ruddres,sed 'thereltJo haid heen argued and ~ove~r­
ruleld defen.~dlan1ls we1re re~quired to answe·r. There fol-
lowed an extended an:d p.rotracted p,retrial p~rocedurre ('Tr. 
88 to 96 .and 98 to 100) and the case was 'set for trial on 
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December 112, 1'949. Trial wa.s the·reafter continued first 
until December 27, 1949 (Tr. 94) and then again con-
tinued until January 3, 1950. 
Plaintiff. was r'epre,sen'ted in all p'r;e-trial matters by 
W. C. Lamoreaux, and upon the 'trial by W. C. Lamo~­
e1aux.·and B. E. Roher'ts. Def·en1d!ants were represented: 
Flint Distributing ·Comp1a.ny 'aJl:d Leland B. Flint hy 
Harley W. Gus~tin and HaroJd R. B. oyer; ·SiaJ.t Lrake Hrard-
ware by Frrank A. Johnson; Gr'ayhar E'lectric by W. W. 
Ray and Athol Rawlins; Z. C. M. I., The Paris Comp1any 
antl Ree·d Bigelorw lby P 1aul H. Ray, S. J. Quinney and 
Al1b~rt R. Bowen; E. M. Royl~e 'and Frank Warren hy 
D'e]be~t M. D·:vaper ; Rohe!r't Nevins by Gordon B. Chris-
tens,on, an!d Orv:ill. J. Coon by M·arvin J. Be·:rtoch. 
Ov~r the 'olbJection ·and affidavit of counsel for all 
defendants thJat 'the Honora:b~e Josieph ·G. J ep·pson was 
biaJs·ed anJd prejudiced •and the'rerore di:squalifie~d to hear 
and try the clrus,e·, Judge J epp:son. caNed th·e, ~ase ~o'r t'ri·al 
before himse~lf ·and a jury on JanuaJry 3, 1950 (Tr. 460). 
:T·lre affidavit denominate~d ''AFFIDAVIT' .OF BIAS, 
·C·ERTIFIC.A:TE O·F C·OUNSEL, AND APPLT·CA'T'IO·N 
FOR DIS.Q·UALIF'ICATION .O'F JUDGE,'' signetl'and 
swolrn to hy -counsel for !all the. rdefendants, omitting the 
c!ap1tion ·and signJatur'els, :re,a.Jd as rol~orws: (Tr. 101 to 104). 
' ''The un1der:signeld, ~attoii'ne~s ·of record or 
·Otherwise, f!o~r the! V!~rious defendants. in the: ruho;ve-
entitJled caUJse 'amid 'action, afte1r being ~duly sworn 
eacil f:or hims·eJf (iepos,e:s and sa.ys: 
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'' Thrut h·e is of the :belief th'rut the H>ono,rahle 
Jos·eph G. Je·pps!on, the Judge hefiore. whom the 
above cause is set for trial, is. p·rejudiced therein 
'ag·ainst the defendants ~above n1amHd Rn'd ~s:ome, if 
not aM, of their respective attorneys, and h!as a 
biaJs in favor of the P'laintiff aboVle nam'ed. 
''That the said Judge has giVlen the, appietar-
ance of a peJrsonal ·desire rto try ·said cause and 
affiants bHlieve tha:t he, the s'ai'd Judge, for T'e'a-
sons personal to hims1eJlf, ha;s retaine'd and is 
attemping ·to retain on his .own trial ·calen!dar s,aid 
oo.use for triaJl, 'although n:o~mally fby re'as:on of the 
rules and practices of 'the Judge18 of the Third 
J udic±ai Court in anJd ror S'aillt Liake Clorunty, State 
of Utah, ·s.aid eause would, :as of this !date, he as-
signed 1befio:re, 'all entirely dif:Ve1rent Judge, an!d 
thiat as of 'this d!ate the said HonoT'able· Jos'eph G. 
JeppsiQin wol]l:d nOit. h'ave assigned to him, in regu-
lar course, the 'trial of con·tro;verte:d ma1tlter:s; thrut 
on the 2'9th day of No:vember, 1949, at a p·re-trial 
hearing of the ruboVle en~ti tled cause ~and ·action, a 
motion. hy all of the ·defendants then p·resent w'as 
mrude· 1t1rat 'the. tria1 of the, sai·d c'au:s~e,'he continue!d 
to the month of January because of the period 
prior to Ch'rts'tma.s heing 'an inconV'enient time for 
the 1defendants involved in the ~aclti'On, theo 1said 
triai having theretofore 1been set ro'r the 12tth day 
of Dec;emher, 1949, which motion wa,s oln D·eeemiber 
5, 19·49·, at ~a further pre-1Jri'a!l hearing of S'aid cause 
denied hy s·aid Judge 1an'd ~the caus~e set for trial 
on December 27, 1949 ; 1th'at on illre ,s,aid 5th da~ of 
D1ecemher, 1949, art a fll'lthe1r pre-:triial hearring the 
~s,aid Judge: permi:tt~d the pillaintiff to fille: a moti:on. 
to amend its 'third 'amended compl~aint rtlrerettlofore 
filed herein an1d ·set sai:d motion, on th:~e·e days 
nortJ.ce, ro~ he'aring; th~aJt 'OU a further p·re-triaJ. 
hearing 'of said ·caU!se· he~d on Decemb~r 9, 1949, 
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the said Ju.dge gr,anted p·laintiff's moltion to fur-
ther 1amend its thir'd amended eomp~aint, denied 
to the: ~de(~en!d!ant:s, Z. C. M. I. and Grayhar Eie~tric 
C'omp·any theiT' 'alsser:te'd rights. to file counte-r-
cilJaims herein, and ·a;t. the request of the attorn:eys 
for 'the p[aintiff sno·rtened def·end:an!ts.' 'S'tatutoey 
time within which to 1answelr the third arneln!ded 
· comp·~aint ~as furthle1r atnen:de'd 'on sai1d day, re·-
quil'ing said ~deren1d!ants to p·lead .thereto hefiore 
F-ri!day, Deeemher 16·, 1949; that :on 'a furltheir pir&-
triaJl hea:r.ing 'of s:ai1d caus~e~ held on Decemiber 16, 
1949·, the said Judge, although s~ai!d caus'e was not 
:at is'sue, denie'd the motion of defendant, Graybar 
Electric ·Comp,any th·at the cause he continued rO:r 
trial Ito s·om·e: :date heyon'd D·ecemiber 27, 1949, 
o'rdereld \the he:aring on th·e demur'relr:s of the· de-
fendants, L,eJ~an'd B. Flint, F[in~t DisrtrihUJting ·Com-
lplany, Ree·d Bige[nw, The P!aris Comp,any and Z. 
·C. M. I., which demurre!rs were filed at the· time 
of 's:aid pre-triJa[ heM'ing, und fiorthwith an'd pre~ 
functoril.y o~ertrul~d lthe sam~e, denying at s1aitl 
time a motion. to 'S'trike like,wise f:i!led on said day 
by the srai:d !defend~aD!ts, Leland B. F1int an'd Flint 
Distrl!bu!ting ·Comprany, and at s~a.jjd time~ :denied the 
mo1t:iJon. of tihe d·e£enidan!ts Le~and B. Flint and 
Flint Dils·tributing iC1ompany tha;t the cause be 
s1tricken firom the trhtl :Calendar on the ground 
itliat tire· 1Srame wa:s not ~at issue, and the~reupon 
o:rde!reld ail of the· ·defendan·ts no1t p·revious~y 
·answe1ring to the ·third runen:d8ld comp~aint as 
further amenJdeid to ·do ·S:O on, and in some in-
stan-ce's heforr-·e, the 20th 'd!ay of Decemhe'r, 1949; 
rfuat 1the mrutteJriS and things. h·e1rein'alb'OiVe~ set ftorth 
~anid the 1a£ore1s!aid raciliions1 10[ saiJd Judge w·elfle aJ..l 
made and h!a!d over the 'Oibdections 10[ the: defentl-
ants. and exc:ep1ttons iduly 'taken therelto; ·that refer-
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enoo is hereby made t'o tlte record and files in the 
above entitled eause and by 1such refeTence the 
s·ame wre made a part hereof for all pru'rpioses. 
'' Tha~t the undersigned affian1Js, th•e sai'd 'at-
tOTn.eys, verily be}ieve that lthe p1rejudice an·d bias 
of the said Judge is shown 'by the ·capricious, arbi-
trary and pre-emptory conduct aforesaid and his 
bias in £avor of th·e plaintiff is ap~p1arent, an~d ·af-
fiants verily believe that the defendants re~tt'e,.. 
s·ented by tltem respe~tivelly cannoit ~have .a f,air an{i 
impartialtriaJ. ·on the merits of s•aid ~acti'on lbefoT'e 
sraid Judge. 
''This affidavit is m'rude pursu:ant ~to subdivi-
s~on Ch) of Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Civil. 
P:vocetdure in effect on J·am.uary 1, 1950, •and in 
making this ~affidavit and ~as a p·art thereof the 
unijffio:signed aJttorne:ys repi-·es:en.t th!at the, slaid 
affidavit and the rap~plicrub.ion in connection theT'e-
with rare maJde in go1o1d faith. 
'' Wh'erefore, ~all the ;defendants named in the 
·aJbove entitled caus'e by an!d th-rough theiT under~ 
srigneJd attorne"Jls p·ray ~rua;t the 1saiu Judge, the 
HonJoraJble J'O'S'eph G. J e:pp~son., shall he· disqu1a1i-
fied ·and sh'all!l p•roceed no further helr~in ·except 
to eau1s'e the said ~action to be heard an!d delter-
:rnined b,y ranortheir Judge: Within saild D1stricft. '' 
'The 'affi!davit was refl]sed and th'e Judge faile'd to 
dris~quailiify htims1elf for th'e r~8JSIOIJliS, 810 raJr 'BJS can be 
gaJthe:red from tire reeord, (1) tlraAt the· lde~£enldan,ts made 
no 'sih!oiWing tnaJt there waJs another judge avail,aJble ready 
to handle the matter, ('2) exp,ens,e· to the, ~county, (3) 
n;othlng ·app'e'are'd in the uff~davit that ·eould n'ot have 
1been p~reiV'iorus~ly ~al'led 'to tlre ;court's attenltion, and ( 4) 
I 
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that the ~appllication of rule 63 (h), un1de·r which the, affi-
1davit was made, ~omd not, be feaJsd.b:le ·an'd would work 
injustice un!der rule 1 (h) (;T1r. 443 to 460.) 
It is. conten'ded that the bias ·and p'rejudiee. as,se~rted 
by the: •aff~daVit ·fin!ds ~omirmrution in the ·o~de·r granting 
the new trial as to these ·ap·p'ellants, which bia1s ·anid preju-
dice was: evidenced throughout the trial. 
Judge J·epp,son having deni:ed de.£endanlts' appliC'a-
tion for his disqualification, rt:cial began befiore hlm ·anti 
a jury on J,anu:rury 3, 19·50, ·and was concluded on Febru-
aJry 4, 19'50. On :and 1hetween the!se days twen1ty ·days· we~e 
actually COD!SUmed in the, trial :of the. issu·e1S. A:t the CllOS'e 
of 'the evideU:ce, and after Jboth sU.·des hrud rested, e•ach of 
the 'defe·ndan!ts pr~s.enteld lan:d ~argued ·a motion. fior {}i-
, reeted verdict. ·Corl.llfsei for plaintiff confessed the mo-
trons of Wa!rren ·a:nd Co:on. The court denie!d ·all other 
moitions ~and sent the case to the jury. Befor'e the cruse 
went 'to the jury 1the cour't. receive:d fTom ·all p1arties their 
reque1s1t1s for instructionlS. The1~eaf1Je·r extenlded disc1]s-
s.ion!s. were b:aJd by the: court and ·cJormsel for the consi'der-
ation of reque,sts iand 'Of '·the. court's P'ropolsed instruC!tiolJl'S. 
It willlik!elly ibe· convenient £or 'the~ ·court if we set dorwn aJt 
this point (ce'!4tain p1ortion1s of 'the. instructions which ~are 
particu!la:rly germane to 'Our 'argument. Such iDistruc-
tions were given f'o:r the ~rurpos.e: of applying the rule 
of law which ·I'Iequi'res th~at the ·exi'S'tence of 'a conspiracy 
mus1t he es:t;aJblish~d, if ·at all, 1by c;lear and eonvineing 
evidence: 
'' Irnstruction. No. 3 (portions) 
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''You are instructed that the existenc-e of a 
conspiracy is neVler p'resumed. It may, however, 
:be pro,re'd ·by cir:cumstanrtiaJ evid·ence. ~The P'lain-
tiff has the iburden of proving th'at 'a conspiracy 
exis,ted ·and not only hy a. p·reponderamce of the 
evidence but by evidence that is 'Clear and con-
vincing ... Therefo're, uniess you 'are satisfie·d 
by clear ;an;d convinc.in·g ·evi'den·ce th~at 'a consp:i'racy 
eristed, you must find in faV~or of 'all of the de-
fendants and agains!t the plarl.ntiff, no cau'se of 
acti<>·n. 
''Whether you contsider the ·acts of the 1de-
fendants to he 'lawfllli. or unlawfu'l would m1ake 
no difference if there i's no clear ~and convincing 
proof of a eombinati!on o~r understanding ·among 
some :or all. of ~the defen·da.nts, to eontro[ p:r~ces o~ 
limit phllintiff's supp'ly of me'rehandi'Se in re~ 
str3rlnt of trarle, because in the ,a:bse~nce of such 
!pl"oof the plaintiff canno1t re.cove-r. 
'' Y'Ou aTe further ins-tructed th:a;t 1fue, bur~de:n 
is upon plaintiff to proVJe by clear ~and convincing 
evi·dence thrut each 'One, orf the defendants know-
ingly and intentJional1y joined in the conspiracy, 
U you. S'hould find thelre was a ·CiOUSpiiracy, ~and if, 
as to ~any ·defendJaiDt, p·l!aintiff ha:s fai~l~d to p~oVle 
by clear ~and convincing ~eiVidence- thart such de-
fendant has so jotine'd a ·conspiTacy, then yom· 
verdict must he in fiaVJor of such defen1dant and 
against plaintiff, no cau's'e of action.'' 
'' Iwstruction No. 8 N (Poritions) 
''In order to prove a conspirajcy 1hy circum-
stanti~all 1e~dence there mu,s~t he substantial p:r'oof 
of circumsrtJance1S from which it may he reas'ooobly 
inferred that a corrsp[racy existed. It cannot be 
es'ta:blished hy conj~ec:ture and. speculaltron alone, 
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but 'the proof must ~be CJlear and convincing, and 
if the facJts. :and cir~cumstanees. relie:d upon 'are as 
consistent with a lawful p·u:rlpose ·as with ran u.ni'aw-
ful rmde:rtaking they are not sufficient to esta'b-
li1s1h·a ·con·spri:racy.'' 
''I nstruc·tion No. 11 
''While it is neces'sa;ry in or.der to e'stablish 
the exis.te~nee of 'a conspiracy to p,rove1 by C!Lear 
and convincing ·evidence given in the cause, 'a com-
fblination. of two or more p~ers1ons hy ~onceTt of 
a<5tion to aceomp,lish the alleged wrongful pUT-
p1ose, Jie't it i!s not neeess1ary to p~rove thait the 
con:spi:vators came together and entered into a 
fiormaJl agreemenJt to ef£ect thtat purpo:se. Such 
common designs and purposes may he proved by 
·circumstantial evidence. 'Such common designs 
may he regarded as proved if you believe from 
clear and ~onvincing evidence given in the cause 
that the parties to the conspiracy were actually 
pursuing in ·concert the common design or pur-
p~ose, whether BJcting separately or together, by 
common or different means, if such common or 
different means all were leading to the same 
unlawful ·result. 
''In thi!s -<~JonnecJtion you rure in1s1tructed that 
if you find from ·Cilear 'and ~convincing eVidence 
thitt 'two or morte of the ~defrendants were, actually 
pursuing 1in eoneert a eommon de1sign to fix and 
reguilirut.e p:rice~s in 'S1alt Lake City on melrchanldis,e·, 
then rsuch 1de.f en.dants. S'O 1a1cting in ·Concert would be 
con:spliring !and ;confederating ror SUCh prurpiO'S!eS. 
For a consp~i'ra.cy :to ·exi:slt the:ve: need he no forma11. 
meeting n.f the ~onspi'rators or 'any formal agree-
ment, but it i:s 'suffi-cient if p~ers'ons !act in concert 
to aooompJi:sh. ·th·e purpoS'es lrere~in sp1eeified. '' 
''Instruction No. 30 ( P'ortion1s) 
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"Unless you al'Je· satisfied 'by clear and con-
vincing evidenee, and hy a pre·pon;derance of all 
of the evidence, tlhrut 'th·eire. was a eonsp~racy 
formed and :carried out 'as alleged in pl,aintiff''S 
comphllint, yoll 'viii be nequired to find in faVJor 
of the defendiants .an'd ugainst the p1laintiff, no 
cause of action. '' 
Having he-ard the instructions of the court, the jury 
retired and thereafter return·ed with its unanimous ver-
dict !agalinst th,e plaintiff and in favo1r 'of al!l defendan'ts, 
including these appeilanrts (Tr. 142, 143). 
On the 15th ~day 'Of February, 1950, p,l,aintiff filed its 
motion for a new tria[. On September 5, 1950, Judge 
Jeppsnn rule'd upon the motion f01r new tria[ in this 
language: 
'' T·he ~a:ho;ve ~enti,tled eruse, having 1been he,relto-
fore taken under ·a~dviS'e·ment to this date, and the 
·Court having con's~de1red and he~ng fu!lly advised 
in :the p·remise,s, :it is or1de'r,ed that defendants' 
moltion •to 'strike the :affidavit of Bryant G. B:adgeT 
i,s ·dem~d. I~t is further ~orr'dered tha:t pilaintiffs' 
motion for a new ~tr~al against th'e ;defendanJts 
Graythar El,e·etric Comp:any, a corpor,ation, Z. C. 
M. I., a eorrporation, an!d Sa:l~t Lake H·ar:dware 
Comp,any, ·a eorp'Oiriation, is denied. It i1s further 
ordered that pl'arintifrs ' m·o:tion for 'a new trila;l 
against tthe defendants: Lelan;d B. Flint, The 
:F1lint D~strlibuting ·Comp~any, a corpo~ation; R.eed 
Bigelow, The· P~ari1s C·ompany, a co1rpor:rution; 'and 
Rolbert Nevins is he,re by g:rantred on the gr'orun:ds 
that the verdiet :i!s -a.gaillJst lthe weight of the -evi-
dence 1and rtha,t a new trial i's r~equi'red to prevent a 
milsearrirage of j usti.ce. ' ' {Tr. 161) . 
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We -are .s·eeking to reVlef!se that ordeT and to rein-
state the ve,rdiet of the jury. 
The points relie1d upon by ap·pellants are specified on 
pages 8 and 9 of their petition for ~app;eaJl. Mlof those 
~1orints, will he covereid in ·this argument. The· poin1tS will. 
be pre,serited here in an o:rder different than th~at. in which 
. they ,a;re 'listed in ·the· p~etiti;on, and will he somewhat re-
crust, regrorupe·d and conso~idruted. 
I. 
(a) The order ap·p·e.aled fr'Om shows. upon its face 
that ·there is. an inV'alid usurpation of power not v:ested 
in the trial Judge hy statu'te or app[i·ooble ruile of civril 
proceduTe. 
(b) 'Th:e recor:d will show that the:re is no sufficient 
or .any gTOnnd upon Which the trial court could le·galiy 
grant a new 1triail as against any nf these ap~pelilanrbs. 
The rtria.Jl court as,signed aJs. his. :rtea:son for grantting 
a new tri'a!l ' 'lthat the verdict i1s against the· weighlt o[ 
the :evide·nce, and tha1t a new trial is1 required to prevent 
·the miscarriage of justice. ' ' 
Th~s. is. equivalent, in the lighlt of the Rule's of Civi~ 
Proce!dure ·to ·saying that the ve~rdi~cit i~s against the weight 
of the eviden-ce, wher'ef o~re 'a new triai is neces,S'all'y to p(f·e-
vent a miscarriage of justice·. 
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'The grounds upon which a new tri'al m:ay be grante~d 
after verdict 'Of the jury a.~e limited to Ruile 59 (a) and 
(d)·. They rea:d aiS follows : 
'' (a.) Grounds. ~suhjec.t 1Jo the p~ro~isions of 
Rule· '61, ·a new trial may be grante!d to all or any 
·of the partie1s and ~on afll or P'art of the· i'ssues., 
for any of the £oliowing caU!s:es ; p·roiV'i!ded, how-
ever, •that on ·a moltion for a new trial in an ·action 
tried without a jury, the· court may open the judg-
ment if one h~as he en entered take a:ddi'tional testi-
. . ' ' 
mony, amend findings. of fact ·and conclusions of 
law ocr.- make new findings and conCJlusions, and di-
rect the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the p;r,oceedings of the 
~orurt, jury or adverse party, or !any orr1deT of the 
court, or libuse of ·dis-cretion by which erther p•art,y 
was p1reven1Je,d from having a Eair trial. 
('2) . Misconduct of the jury; and when.eve:r 
·any one or more 'Of the jur,ors have 'he~en induced 
to 'as1sen1t to 'any genel}al or ·speeiai verdict, 'Or to a 
finding on ·any ques~tinn submitted to them hy the 
ooru:rt, by resort to a 'determination b·y ehance or 
as a result of bribery, ~suCJh miseonduct may he 
proved :by the affidavit of 'any one of the juror's. 
('3) Acci'dent or surp1ri'se, which or~dinary 
1pii"Uden;ce~ Ciould n·o:t have guarde·d against. 
('4)! N·ewly diseovered evi!dence, materia[ for 
'the party malci.ng fue ~ap~pliootion, which he could 
not, with re~~soD!ahle diligence, have dis~CJo~ere'd 
an·d p!'lo,duced ~a:t the tria[. 
(!5) Exce's~sive 'Or UI!ade:quate ·damages, ap~ 
pearing 1t:o h:aVie he~en given un·der the influence 
of pas'sion or p·reju!di'ce. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
('6} fusuffi1CJiency oif the: evidence to justify 
the verdi!ct ;or other :decision, o·r thrut i't i1s against 
~aw. 
(7) Error in law. 
"'(d) On Initiative of C10urt. Noltlater !tlhan 
10 days a~ter entry of judgment the corurt of its 
own initia:tive· may orde:r a new triai on motion of 
a pa;rtty, ~and in the orr,der sh:all sp:ecify the gr'ounds 
therefor. ' ' 
The record wil.l'show that ~a veTdict of the, jury was 
received 'on February 4, 1950. ·The· orde·r granting a new 
trial was m:ade ·se:v-en mon'ths 'lalter, on Sept.emhe'r 5, 1950. 
It is pJali.n, 'then, 'thaJt Ru[e ·59(d) i1s enti'rely inapp[licalble 
to tills cruse. On 'September 5, 1950, the trl'al J udgte wrus 
wi·thout jurisdiction to exercise uny power under Rute· 
5·9(d)'. 
:The iJ'rovi!si!ons, of Ruie 5·9 (a) (l), (2), (3), ( 4), (5) 
and ('7)' were -clearly not invok~d hy the: trial Judgte· in 
~support orf his orde·r. Tills le·a:ves for con:s~deration only 
5'9'(a) ( 6), ,an,d only the' fir:st p1al'lt of that suhs·ection could 
be of 'any 'sign~ficanee :he.re beCJause· 'there is not eiVen a 
hint in the Judge'''s order "t~ha;t the· verdict i!s again'st 
law." 
Our inquiry i 1s there.for'e' limite~d to rthat portion of 
59('a) (6) which authoriz·els a nerw 'tria[ for ''insufficiency 
of the evidence to jus1tify the ver:diclt. '' The court did not 
set rbhe ve:rtlielt :alsti.'de for insufficiency of the, evitlence 
to :suppoi:rt i!t, !hut fbeeause he ·eon'ceived th!at the ve~dict 
was 'against 1the ·Weight ~of lthe evidence. Un!derr the I;aw 
in thiJs p·articu1ar case, 1the orde'r comp~laine~d of is invalid 
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in this :ca:se for 1two reasons : ( 1) there is no authortity 
in rule or 'statute for ·setting asi'de, a V'e'rdict 'because the 
trial Judge thinks it is ·against ithe weight ~of the evi'dence; 
an'd ('2) !because these defendants were ·c[harged With 
fraudulent conspiracy, a:nd their liability or not wa.s not 
left to delp1end upon the weight or p~reponder:ance of the 
evidence, 'hut could be esta:blished 'and found to exist only 
upon ''-elear and convincing ·ev:iJdenee. '' This a;spieet of 
the ~se wili he p~resente'd and ·argued in full detail in 
a subsequent 'S'ecti~on of 1thi1s brief. Suffribe it ~to s~ay here 
\ 
thaJt 'the Judge instructed 'the jury thait they could find 
defendants guilty only up'on proof that i's elear ~and con-
vincing. 'H·aving ·aJpplied tthrut rule as fixing the quality 
of proof nooess,ary to suppo'rt a ve;rdict agamslt the 
defendants, his OTder th:at the ver'dictt in favor of defend-
ants wa;s against tJhe weight of the evidence shows upon 
its race 1JhaJt i 1t WaJS /Lacking in the subs:tanee ~and vitality 
nece'S1Saxy m 'Setting aside the verdict. 
It will he ·remembered '·tha.t P'laintiff ',s moti'On for a 
new trial ·assigns alll 1o[ the grounds authorized by the 
Rules of Civil Pro'cedure·, an'd s'Ome grounds niOit so 
aufuoirized, but the or,der of the· court 'shoiWs th'at ilt wrus 
not hased upon any groun'd 'Sp·e:cifi~d in the Tule1s. When 
) 
viewe1d in the ii~ht of plainrtiff',s third 1amended com-
pl,aint, 'a1s. 1amended, the :S'everal an1swers iOf the defen1d-
an!ts, and !the instructions, of 'the court, the or1de1r setting 
as['de the ve'rdict s~hould f:all of its orwn inhe1ren,t weakness. 
P 11aintiff ~charged 'a frau'dulent consp~ir'acy and ·demanded 
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treble •damages therefor. ·The an1sw·e'rs ·denied the ex-
~s'tence of :any ·CJonsp[racy. The insitru0tions :directed the 
jury thrut a conspiracy eoul1d nott he found ito exi:s:t upon 
the 'simple weigf.ht or p:reponderance of ·the. evi'dence, 
hut only upon ~lear and convincing evidence. The jucy 
fnund 'defendants not gui·lty, and the verdict wrus, . set 
rus:i!de 'as '' 'agains't 1the, weight of tbhe evidence. '' 
We aTe aware of the analysis made hy this. courtt in 
King v. U. P. R. ·Oo., 2.12 P. ('2d) 692 to determine "the 
bre~adth of the· 'trial (~orur't 'is. di:sicretion in granting 1a new 
trial,'' bU!t thalt ca:se an1d all the cases revi·ewe'd th'erein 
are ·Cilearly distingllis.hruble from the in!s'tant caJse, !aJs, rto 
the grounds upon whiclh 'a new trial was grante'd. Begin-
ning with the eas·es reviewe·d in the King ease we find the 
f'olfiorwing grounds :S'tated :as. ·a 'basi's fbr a new trial: 
J,ames V'. Robertson, 39 U. 106-8, 117 P. 1074, g~ound: 
\ 
''The: eviden'c.e did nott justify th·e: ver'di·ct in 
favor of ithe reslpon:de~t. '' 
OU!r new rule 59{a) [·s :aJs, fol•lows: "Insufficiency of 
the eviden!c.e to ju,stify the verdiet. '' 
If there· is a difference in :the two startements it is 
unimporitanrt now. 
Valiotis v. Utrah-Ap,ex, 55 U. 151, 184 P. 802. ·This 
court 's'taJted 11he grounds as follows: 
''It will he perceived that ·counsel fior -app~el­
l~ant do no:t contend that 1:Jheire, was. no evidence to 
1sup·piort rtJhe verdicit, but tha.t the verdict is so p~alp­
ably ag1ainst the clear weight of the evidence BJs to 
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indicate tlrat the trial court abuseld its discre'tion 
in refusing to grant a new trim. In other words, 
we are asked to review the weight of the evi-
dence. '' (Italics ours) 
In disposing of ''weight 'Of evidence'' as a ground 
for ~a new trial, this ~~ouTt in the Valiotis oose ~said: 
' ' To set 'B.Jside the verdict in ;such ~a ca!se would 
be to invaJde rtilie province of the jury, in whom i1S 
ves·t~d tfue power to decide all questions. of fact 
and to whom all evidence thereon is to be addres-
sed.'' 
In this case ·a clear distinction irs maJde between the 
unauthorized grorun!d that the ve1rdict is againis1t the 
weight of the evidence an:d the ground tbat there is :a legal 
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict. Fur-
ther in the V alio'tis :CBJse rtfu.ere appe1aJr1S: 
''This. ;court ha!s repeatedly he'ld that the dis-
cretion 'Of rbhe tria!l C!OU.rt, ·exe:vei'se1d in granting or 
refusing to ~anrt ~a mo;t:iJon for a new trial, b·ased 
on the insufficiency of the evi·dence vo justify the 
verdict, cannot 1be interfered with whe1n, upon ex-
amin~aJtion 'of the evidence a:s d!isclosed b~ the 
recorrd, i~t is apil1arent 'tlrat there is ~a 1Subs'tantial 
conflict of 'Hvidence as to m~ate~rial is~sues of f:aCJt 
in the ,caJse relative to which the in'sufficiency i1s 
alleged. ' ' (I rta1ics orurs) 
In tJhe abOive ·ea;se·, as in the eruse· at (bar, the~ ground 
relied upon waJs '''tJhat the ve~rdic.t was again!st the wei~h·t 
of rbhe evidence·'' :and this ·Ciourt clearly he1d that such 
was not .a p1rop~er groun'd upon which to !base an order 
granting a new trial. 
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we rare :awa:re of no u.tah ease granting a new trial 
on the sole grrownd that the verdict is ag~amst th.e weight 
of the evidence, .and under ·the· new rulers, the~ eourt !aCJting 
on its ·own initirutive i!s limi1ted to the grorund1s avati.la:bJe 
to rt\he morving pa:rrty in ;ordering a new trial. The~ grounds 
set fortJh in the new rules for granting 'a new ·trial are 
broad enough to ·Clover every kind of injustiee that may 
result from ra verd~~ct lan!d rtlie prarty againlst whom the 
order f.or a new 'tr~'al runs, ·as, we1llas the appellate court, 
irs entitle1d ~to know from what unlawful ae!t or thing the 
injustice arises. 
It may be admitted ~thrut some· confusion app·e'ars in 
judicia[ ldeei·si!on~s a.ttemptin.g ·to cle,a.riy defline the p'riOv-
ince ·of the eourt rand 'nhe prrovince o.f the jury, in a jury 
trial, but in ·the last anal~si·s i1t mu:st he held that 'statu-
tory rules mean ·something or the~ mean nothing. 
If 'a ·tri:ai ·eourt -can 'say and get away with it, ''I oTder 
a new tria;! beeau1se my 'sense of ju'stiee· is. offended,'' or 
''that 1the jury mis:aprprehendeld or ignored the weight of 
the :evidence,'' then the ;rules meran nothing, ibeCiaUrSe they 
a;re [compJeterly ignored, an'd the finding of ra jury upon 
any i'ssue in ·any ~ea1se is 1simpJy ·advirsory, to he aecepted 
or rej eeted at wi'll hy tJhe tri,a:l judge. 
If it fbe! 'though1t th1a,t the- 1Ciourt has power to .grant 
new triall1s: ·for rerus'on1s nolt s~tated in tlhe statutes or rule'S, 
then ~again, ~the ruies mean. n!othing, heeau'Se i.f he cannot 
find :a ground s.taterd in the· rule'S. he m'ay 'Su1bver1t them 
by res-o,rt to hlrs rsense of jU!stice, wh·ieh sometime!s, though 
not always, irs ba1sed upon a p~rejudiced vie·w of the 
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situation. The sta:tutes 'v-e-re p:als1s.e'd and the rule's were 
made with ·a view to p'roviding grounds for the c101rrect!i·on 
of all injustices, and .aJll the eourt need do to in'sure. jru's·tice 
is to base his order upon 1Uhe :app:ropriate strututory 
grorund or ground~s if such exist. 
We ·submit that if injustice i's. invoJved in the ve·rdiet 
in ·the ins,tant -ca.Jse, it ·eould have been 'state1d as ·some 
omis'sion, mis·conduct, or other matter-s enumerated in 
rule ·59. But ~since no ·strututoTy ·grounds h·ave ·heen 1stated 
it must be assumed that 'the court found no statuto'ry 
ground upon whiclh ·he eou'ld ,clearly ·base his. order and, 
therefore, relied on the language of some eourt:s to the 
effrect thaJt 1fue '' weiglht ·of the e:vi1dence'' might he one 
of the elements -considered in determining whether there 
i!s rnsuf£icJiency 10rf the ·e:vi!dence to jus.tify •the. Veirdict, but 
as 'S'hown in the V aliotis ~ase, 1SUpT1a, granting ·a new triai 
on the ground '''thait the verdict is 'SO P'rulp1afb~y again~st the 
cleaT weight of the evidence . . . would fbe, to inva:de tihe 
province of the jury, in WflOID is Vested t!he plOWer to 
decide ~all questions of fact and to whom :a:ll evidence 
thereon i:s to be addres'setd. '' 
But in no event ·CJan King v, U. P. R. Co., 212 P. ('2d) 
692 sustain 'the order here comp[~ained of. Th·e;re tb:e 
i'S'SiUes were ~to be deitermined upon the simpJe weight oT 
preponder'ance: of the evidence. while here Plaintiff collll!d 
prev~ai·l 'Omy UpOn 'Cilear and convincing evidence. 
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II. 
Ca) The reeo:vd ,s(horws that plaintiff failed to prove 
by ~clear and ·convincing evidence th~at a eorrslpti.Tacy eve·r 
e~i!sted :among ~th·e defendants, or any of them, and the 
record ·cle·arly ·shows ·tltat the jury was not -convinced iby 
plaintiff's evi'dence. 
('h) The record shows th,at Rs a matter 'Of law there 
wa;s never any ·eonsp,Iracy among the defendantls·, Oil" 
any of them. 
(c) 'The· record shows tihaJt :the verdict of ~the jury 
1n f:aVJor orf the defendants doe's not constitute :a mis-
carriage of justice·. 
(d) 'The record ISlh!orws 1Jhat ra verdict finding the 
existence :of a ~onspiracy would have been without suh-
stanti,a1 or p·roibrutive support, and would h~ve heen a 
misea;rriage. of jus:tice. 
Points II (~a), (h), (c)· :and (d) s·et for'th !aboiVe. wiH be 
argued together. 
The ·defendants in ~this ca!s'e' represent tWJo groups: 
di'strihutJ01rs: who 'sold their merchandise at who~esa1e for 
re's'aJ.e by deah~r~s, and ·dealer;s who purC!hrused me·rch;an .. 
disH from distri!bu!l1ors and T'eso[d it at retail ·to the con-
suming pu!hlic. Defendants Graybar Ele·ctric Comp,any, 
Flint Distributing ·Comp1any, Z. ·C. M. I. :and Salt Lake 
Hardware Comp;any were rdistribrutoT'S. Defendants O:rvi1 
C. Coon, Frank Warren, Robert Nevins, Reed BigeJow, 
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E. M. Royle Comp~any, arrd The Pari·s ~C1omp1any we're 
dealers. Defendant Le~land B. Flint was p~re1sident o.f 
Flint Di's tributing Co. 
E~ach distributor denied i1hat i~ts busine~s~s decisions 
'vith relation to plaintiff had heen brought ~bout, or in 
any manner influence1d, 'by anything said, done or omitted 
by 'any other ~distributor, or by :any dealer. · E~ach dea!ler 
denied that he induced or atte:rrup1ted to ind-uce any di'S-
triJbutor to deal or not to ~deal with pl~aintiff. Each dealer 
compl'ained ·to Glenn Earl about the vi·olrution of. the 
~air T~ade laws ·by the pJ:aintiff, and th~e defendant 
dealers, and 10tlher dealers in RCA I"eeords, met together 
to discus-s their rights un·der fue Fair T'rade L~aws. 
T:he Courrt instructed tlhe jury that ea0h ·de,aler h~d 
the right to 1SO comp!lain, and th'at, if the ~dealers believed 
there was ·a violation of the F;air Tr,ade laws, they h:ad a 
right to ~as'Semble for 'a discus,sion of such vi'O'lation. Th1o1se 
instructions are correct srbatements of the law app1licabJe 
to 'the is1sues, ·and the corurt in his order granting a new 
tr1al found no fault with them. 
E;a0h defendant spe:cifi,cally denied the exis1tence of 
any conspiracy, an'd ·eaeh denied partic.ip1ruti'On in any 
concerted ~act!s dHsigned to injure plaintiff. E·rueh defend-
ant ful'ly exp~lained his ~conduct, and set forth logicailly 
and lawfu~ly his rerusons therefor. And ·the jury had the 
right :to !believe defendants' tes1timony. 
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As pointed out above, 1the couTt instructed the jury in 
Ins'truction N10. 8 N illrrut, ''A eon's piracy .cann'ot he estalb-
' ~ishe'd by ·conjecture ·and ·speeulation alone, but p~roof 
must he: clear and convincing, and if the facts and circum-
stances relied upon are as consi1stent with :tJhe lawful a;s 
wiJth tJhe uni:awful undertaking they are not sufficient to 
estaJbli'sh !a eons~piraey. '' 'Sru;ch being the ~law the jury wrus 
I 
bound to find in favor of defendants, and a contrary 
finding would :have been without substantial or p~roibative 
evidence, and would have worked an injustice. In hi's 
ruling up,on the motion for .a new :tri'ai the court fiorund 
no fault with the instructions given. 
'Tihe cltse of the de'fendan:ts was strong enough to 
absolve them from the C!harge of eon'spira;cy as a matter 
o;f law. 'T'he !burden of pironf was upon the piliaintiff, and 
we· ~desire to demons!trate that plaintiff''S C)ase was ·en-
tirely 'lacking in that quality nece,ss1ary ·to make it clear 
and convincing to 'any unbiased mind. On the other hand, 
plaintiff's ~ase w~s of ~sueh a sihaJbby qu~li ty ws to require 
rej·ection in the mind of any unhiase~d p·erson. 
The ·trial court ruled tha:t th:e, j·ury 's verdict wrus 
'':against the weight of fue evidence'' and theref.ore ''a 
misearri·age of justice.'' '' The weight of the evidence'' is 
a 1s·tandar'd ·clearly not app,lieab[e :tn this crus,e. The court, 
in full accord with the law upon the subject, ins.trueted 
the jury that defendants could he found gui·lty of con-
'spir~cy only upon "e1ear and eonvincing evidence," 
which i1s :a :different :and higher standar:d than' 'weight of 
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the evidence.'' \The ·court gave the jury t\he~ ~orrecrt 
standard and :then 'arrOiga;te~d to him's elf the ·right to ap~[y 
a different standard and iby i.ts ap1plication wip1e orut th·e 
jury's verdict. 
Note again that in Inst~c:tion No. 3 this ap·p·ears : 
"'The p11aintiff has the burden of pTorving that a con-
spiracy existed ~a.nd not only by a p~re·ponde:rance of the 
eviden~e 1but by evidence that is clear and convincing.'' 
By that charge 'the court :denied th~~ jury the· right to 
find con1sp~ra:cy by ''a preponderunee of the evidence,'' 
but after the jury had foun~d a verdict in ~a~cordance with 
h~s instructions he 1set the verdict aside by resort to the 
very standard he ~bad forbidden the jury to empJoy. 
The very nature of a conspiracy ea:se calls for the 
application of the rule that p~roof must he ~by clear an'd 
convincing evidence. The p:en-alties for·civil conspiracy are 
far more severe th:an tho1se· in the ordin~ary ~:ivil damage 
cases. A finding of conspliracy not only fixe1S the brusis 
for liahility for ·aill ·damage1s suffered, but subjects the 
defendants to trehle ·damage. In addition to 'all this, a 
corpo;ration is \Sillbject to the· forfeiture of its coTpo;rate 
charter, whieh, as to any ;such corporation found guilty 
would he a de~ath sentence. 
Beeause of the penaltie~s impos-ed it is altogether 
approp1riate~ that the ·Courts. do ~and should Tequire: proof 
of the exiS'tence1 of a eonspir~cy iby clear ~and convincing 
evidence. 
Abbo:tt v. Mille:~ et ~al, 41 S·.W. ('2d) 8919 
!(Mo.). 
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"Berore plaintiff was entitled to recover, it 
was neee,ssary that sihe make· out her ease '·by clear 
and 'Convincing evidence.' Walsih c~se, supra. This 
she failed to do, and the request of the Gregg 
Realty Comp1any for a directed y.erdict should 
have been granted.'' 
Burkholder -et al., v. Westmorela!Jid Coun.ty 
Inst. Dist .. et al., 68 Atl. (2) 436, ·(Pa.) 
decided in 19'49. 
"When ~eonsp~iracy i!s alleged, it must be 
proven by full, ;clear and satisf'a:ctory evidence, 
and wh:en 1p[1aintiff .also re~ies upon 'Subsequent 
acts to es1JaJhlish eons,pirwcy, the acts must 1be sueh 
as cle~arly indicate· p1rior co~lusive combination and 
fraudule·rrt purpose, not slight circumstance of 
·suspicion, and the subsequent -acts must he such 
as to warrant helief and justify con,clusion that 
;s'll!bsequent (acts were done: in furthe·rance· of the 
unlawful combination -and in pursuance of scheme 
to wreck the business and cause the bankruptcy.'' 
· Quackenlbvttsh et al., v. ~8Zate et ·al., 121 P. (2d) 
B31 (Wash.). 
:Suit for damages for conspiracy to ~defraud. Judg-
ment di'Smi'S!sing comp~aint. Affirmed. 
Headnote 1 reads: 
''1. In 'an action for conspiracy to def~aud 
p~laintiffs of ·an interest in 'a mine, to es!tahlish the 
'conspi:rrucy' plaintiff must 'show ·by clear and con-
vincing ~evidence that defe·ndants combined, in fur-
theran-ce of a p~re-\Gonceived pJ·an, unlawfully to 
deprive p~aintiff'S of their interest in the mine, 
:and that overt acts. were done in 'accordance with 
the p~an to their d'amage. '' 
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He'adnote 2 read'S : 
''2. In an action for consp;iracy to defraud 
pl,aintiffs of an interHsrt in a mine where p~ain­
tiffs' evidence disclosed acts of the defendants 
which were as consistent with the l~awful purpose 
of proteeting defendants' interests as they we:r·e 
with the unlawful purpose of conspiring to de-
fraud p~rain tiffs' evidence was. not 'Sufficient under 
requi}}ement for cle'ar and convincing p~roof of the 
elements of conspiracy.'' 
Tlhe court says, page 333 : 
'''The main queistion for our consideration is, 
whether or not V ervaeke and Slate conspired to 
defraud ·and ·deprive ·appellants of their interest in 
the mine through the termination of the option 
contracts. Since this is a question of fact, we 
s'hall detail the evidence which each side pfroff.e·red 
to ·sustain its contention. In weighln.g the facts., 
·however, illle rollowing rules must be kept in 
mind. Appellant must p~rove that Ve~aeke and 
Slate :combined, in furtherance. of ,a p·re-conceived 
plan, to unlawfu!lly dep:rive the comp1a:ny's 'stock-
holders of their interest in the mine, and fuat 
·oVtert acts were done in accordance with this P'lan 
to their damage. 15 C.J.S., Conspir:acy, PP'· 99:6-
1000, ;Sec. 1 to 'Sec. 6; Eyak·Rive·r Packing Co. v. 
Huglen, 143 W~a:sh. 2~29, '2'25 P. 1'23, 2:57 P. 6·38, 'and 
Kietz v. Gold P:oint Mines, Inc., 5 Wash. '2d ·2·24, 
105 P. 2d 71. F·urthe·rmore, ap~pell·a:nt must e~staJb~ 
lis'h the~se ·elements hy clear and convincing evi-
dence·. 'The evidence, moreoiVer, will be insuffi~ 
cient if it di'Sclose1s 'aJcts as~ -consistent with a ~lawful I 
purpose as ·an unl'awful one. Dart v. McDonald, 
107 Wash. 537, 1812 P. 6,28. '' 
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R1oberts v. Saukville Cl(JJYVning Co., 2'6 N.W. 
(
12d) 145 '(Wis.). 
Suit to 'foreclose a mortgage,, counte-~l:aim for dam-
ages for eonsp,iracy, judgment on corunter~l~aim reversed. 
·Court says p~.147 :· 
' '·A claim of ·conspiracy is a dlrallenging al-
le-gation, but in a civil ·action unle'ss the conspiraJCy 
is est~ablished by elea:r 'and convincing e-vidence 
and some a'Ct vrursuant to a formed conspiracy 
;causing ·damage i'S p~ro;ven, no caus-e of :action ex-
ists. 11 Am. J ur. P. 577, Sec. 45.'' 
Ziegle.r v. Hustisford F~a.rmers Mut. Ins. Co., 
2:9'8 N.W. 610, (·Wis.). 
''In -civil actions, where fraud, crime, criminal 
conduct ·oT -conspiracy is alleged, the· ibrurden rests 
upon him who so -charges, to e1sta:blish the p;r:oof of 
such allegations by clear 'and 'S1a:tisfructory eiVi-
dence ... or 'by the cle~ar 1and satisf:actory evidence 
to a reasonable icertainty . . . or hy clear, satis~­
·fa;ctory and convincing evidence.'' 
!Tlra;t clHar and convin1cing evidence is required to 
pTove the eocistence of a eon1spira~cy is clea.rfy e'siJaJb~ished 
by 'the rule's announced in the p;receding 1case1s. Whil·e this 
court, a:s fiar as we. ·are informed, ha;s never :deeided 'a 
~as:e invoiving p1roorf ·of cons:piracy, it h·as in a numbe·r 
of cruses he1d ·that ''ele1ar !and convincing p1roo:f,'' or its 
equivalent, described the quality of evidence neees'S~ary 
to e'stabJis1h the liability of defendants in particular type's 
of eases. W.e1 refer 'below to some of those cases to demon-
str.ate that :all eivi1 cases are not adjudged or decided 
upon the simpJe weight or preponderance of the evidence. 
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And c.e-rtainly there is as 1nuch reason why p·roof of ~on­
spira~.y should require clear and convincing evidence as 
that ·clear :and convincing evidence should be require'd to 
set ·aside ·a relea·se, or to establis1h an oral trust. 
Bu·rni·ngh~am v. Burke et al., 67 Ut·ah 90, 2'45 
P. 977. 
This 'vas an action to res-cind a suhseri1ption or purohase 
of capital stock :and to refover hack monies p~aid thereon. 
"It is argued that the plaintiff wrus required 
to prov.e his case by clear ·and convincing evi·dence. 
That is true to entitle him to an adjudi!cation in 
his favor on the merits, hut not to overcome a 
motion for non-suit. Whether evidence is clear 
and convincing requires weighing, ¢;omp·aring, 
testing, ~and judging its worth wh·e·n eonsidered in 
connection with 'ail the facts: and circumstance's in 
evidence. ' ' 
Capps et al., v. Ca;pps, 110 Utah 468, 175 P. 
(2d) 470. 
This wrus an action to imp~o-se a trust on proceeds of a 
war risk insurance policy. 
"T'he 'su1bstance of the rules announce·d in 
those ca!ses is th'at where a party seeks to estaib-
lis'h a trust by p'arol, the evidenee must he clear, 
convincing and unequivocal. The evidence mus,t be 
cle,ar and una.mhiguoillls. It must he convincing 
and satisfy the trier of the facts that i·t is free 
from fahri!cation. It must be definite, so that no 
dou'bt is left as to the subject matter of the trust 
or 'trust res, or the rights and obligations of bene-
ficiaries and trustee. Testimony whlch is de:s,igned 
to establi~sh ~a trust must he carefully scrutinized, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
to ascertain whether it is so attended with such 
circumstantial guar1antees of trustworthiness that 
it is entitled to credence.'' 
Ro'Senbrarug.h v. Bronc'h, 213 P. (2d) 33'3 
(Utah). 
Involved her-e was the reformation of a eontract on the 
ground of mutual mistake. 
'''The suhstantra:l question confronting us is 
whether the evidence is 'clear and convincing' 
as to the terms of the agreement he:tween the 
p~arties tJhe,reto, whl0h te:rms were intend·ed to he 
embodied in the writing subs-equently executed, so 
as to over'come the presmnption that the written 
in!strument correctly evidences 'SUCh ~agreement. 
As to the meaning :of the !phrase 'clear and con-
vincing,' much has been written. We shall advert 
·to a few typ[cal statements ars. to the content of 
that expression. 
''In the case of Forrester v. ·Cook et al., 77 
Utah 137, 2912 P. 206, 209, it is said : '. . . A party 
seeking relief by r:eformation of a contract Whi~h 
is p·resmned to contain al1 the terms agreed upon 
must estrubli'slh a mutual mistake by evidence that 
is ·ele1ar, 'S'ati,sfructory, and ~onvincing, ~and not by 
a mere or a hare p~reponderance of the evidence 
( c::r.rum v. Reynolds, 5'5 Uta:h 384, 18H P. 100), un-
less a fair preponderance of the evidence clearly 
and 1satis£aetori'ly convinces the corurt o:f the 
err.or .... ' 
''In the re1eently decided ease of GrHener v. 
Greener, Utah, '21'2' P. 2d 19·4, 204, 1Jhi·s coru:rt speak-
ing through Mr. Justice Wolfe s:aid: '·That p·roof 
is convinjcing whi1eh -carries with it, not only the 
power to persuade 'the mind ws to the proibaJble 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
truth or correctness ·of the fact it purports to 
prove, but has the element of clinching such truth 
or correctness.- Clear and convincing proof-
clin~hes what might be otherwise only p1robable 
to the mind.' See also, Nordfors. v. Knight, 90 
Utah 114, 60 P. '2d 1115. With these criteria in 
mind, we examine the testimony herHinabo:ve 'Set 
ftortb..'' 
Jimeniz v. O'Brien, et al., 213 P (2d) 3'37 
(·Utah). 
Here we have a case ·ap:plying the clear, un-equivoC!aJl and 
convincing evideniee rule to a release when it is con-
tended that the releasing party did not have the· mental 
capacity to contract. 
' ' This requirement rthat a releruse can· be 
~avoided only if the evidence i's clea.r, unequivocal 
and 'eonvincing th'at it is invalid, is wel[ supporte:d 
by the authorities. 
"It is to he remembered that '-clear, un-
equivocal an·d 1eonvincing evi·dence,' its a higher 
degree of proof than a mere 'p·}}eponderance of 
the eviderice·,' and approoohes th'at degree of ptroof 
required in ·a criminal 'CJase, viz., 'ib.eyond r·e:ason-
able doubt. ' 
''Proof ·iihat is c10nvincing carries ·with it, 
not only the p~ower to persuade the mind as to 
the truth or p~robahle correctness of the fact it 
purports to p~rove·, but ~has the: e1ement of clinCJh-
ing in the mind 'such trnth o:r 'eorre-ctne:ss . .A!s a 
matter of law the !ptl'aintiff'·s evidence in thls case 
fal!ls short of that 'Standard. '' 
The jury, in the ~se at bar, round unanimously 
that there wa;s no conspiraey, land rendered a Vie~dict 
''no cause- of 'action'' ~as to all ·defen.dants. 
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The record will show. that there was no e:vidence 
before the ·court :and jury whieh :s-quares with the stand-
ard of quality required in such c:ases. In ruling upon 
the motion of plaintiff for a new trial, the trial judge 
refused to be. governed hy 'the who'lesome rule which he 
prop·erly imposed upon the: jury. 
In view of the law of the :case, the tri·al corurt ',s 
order might ·be construed as reflecting its pon~lusion 
i 
that tlhe jury was lbound ·to ·aecep't pJ,aintiff 's case as 
"clear and convincing," hut sueh a conclusion is not 
tena;hle 'becaus·e in ruling on the: motion for a new trial 
the ·court ignore·d ·the ' ''Clear an'd -convincing'' test of the 
eviden~e, and ·s.eized upon a "weight" te'st, which is 
not a test under the Utruh ruJe,s, and if it were it would 
amount to an ~abuse olf di:seretion 'to say that the weight 
o!f the· evidence in this case favors the pJaintiff, and a 
downright pervers~on of the judiciail function to ignore 
ifu.e ''clear ·an~d ~eonvincing'' test imposed upon the jury 
by ·the· court itself and then conclude that the plaintiff 
made a ''elear and convincing'' ease: again's.t any two 
or more of th~se defendants. 
Before ~analyzing the· te,stimony of p~laintiff's im-
portant witnesises, to demonstrate that the jury was not 
require·d to he and ·could not reasonably he expected to 
I 
he 'convinced by !p~aintiff',s cas-e, it seems ap·propriate 
to illustrate the lack of quality in pl'aintiff's cruse by 
reference to some- matte·r's wthleJh affect the entire· case 
land characterize the entire p:r:oceeding. 
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It will be remembered that the four owners 1and 
operators of p~laintiff's husine1ss brought to the enter-
prise little, if any, ·busine'ss exp,erience. Tw01 had been 
appliance S'aie!smen for ·a time, one an emp~loyee of an 
accounting firm, ·and ·ifue other a hook seller. Plaintiff, 
in its corporate form, ·conducted business for only a 
little over 'One yea.r. During that time an important p'art 
of its energies were devoted to the sale of Glenn Earl's 
obsolete radios whi~h plaintiff ~alone, out of 1.7·5 de~aler's, 
was willing to handle. When plaintiff, in its eorporate 
capacity, ceased )busine'S!S in the early piart of 1949, 
Badger 'and B~adley took over the learsehold 'an,d fix:ture1s 
and went right on in ·the retail applranoe business, at 
the corporation'·s. old •S'tand at 38 South Main 'Street. 
T·anner resumed his woTk in the aiooounting office, :and 
~1cDonorugh ~again became an 'appli!an-ce salesman. 
Yet, those f.our luid the~ ~extreme hardihood to come 
into the trial court and ·rusk ~an award from the jury 
of '$600,000.00. ·Such ~a ·demand ·coul·d he ~culated only 
to stultify p~aintiff's entire ·case ~and make susp~ect the 
motives and good :faith 'Of all of p·~aintiff's officers who 
supported the ·demand by their testimony. The· ease 
went to trial upon P'laintiff's third amended comp·laint, 
as amended. ·The prayer of th~rut compJ.aint demanded 
an ~award •against the :defendants, -and each of them, in 
fue sum of $1,330,423..9~2. When one o:f corms~el in hi~s 
opening statement wa:s aborut to mention that fantrustio 
demand ·conns.el for p1laintiff o1bjected, ,an:d the court 
·sustained the ob;jection ( T·r. 530). By then even the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
44 
boundless avarirce of p1laintiff's officers di~d not 'blind 
them to the ·danger that s11;ch a demand might ibe offensive 
to the jury. By 'fh!at time in th~e. p1roceedin~s the demand 
of 1pilairrtiff's third .amended complaint, as amended, was 
beginning ·to embarrass it's officers and counsel. Accord-
ingly, just hefore the ea;se went to the jury the total 
p1rayed for wa:s r~educed to the :smn of $600,000.00 (Tr. 
2190). !The latter sum is 'as mythical, illogical and un-
justified ~as the :amount prayed for earlier. ·The ·amount 
of plaintiff's claim ail'on.e was: 'sufficient to completely 
discredit plaintiff's case. And yet· the trial court has 
ruled that unti1 ·that ~laim ·has been s'atisfied just~ce 
will have mis-carried. 
Among the defendants ~against whom plaintiff sought 
to reco¥er judgment for $600,000.00 are Frank Warren 
and ·Orvil C. ·Coon. At the· elo:se of plaintiff's op~ening 
statement Warren and Coon moved the eourt for dis-
missal, whieh motion's were denied. At the: end of pilain-
tiff 's ease 1fuey again moved for dismis'sal, and their 
motions were ~again denied (:Tr. 1'709 to 1712.). After 
all the evidence was in 1and all p'arties had res,ted, 
Warren and ·Coon moved for directed verdict's. Piain-
tiff then -confessed the motions {Tr. '2187). It thereby 
admitted that it did not have, and never did haVie, a case 
against either Coon or War:ren, and yet insisted upon 
keep~ing both of those individuals in ·court for over a 
month at grerat expense an·d sacrifice. 
The. witne'sses princip,ally relied upon by plaintiff 
to prove ~ons1p[ra1cy were its foour office~rs, Bradley, 
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Badger, nlcDonou.gh and ·T,anner, and Glenn Ear11, the 
R~C .. A. man. The effect of the tri~al court's order i~s that 
the jury was ·bound to find the testimony of those men 
clear and convincing. True enou·gh, the court had in-
structed the jury that they were the exclusive judges 
of the cred.i!bility of the witnes'ses, and that they coul·d 
find a conspiracy to have ·existe·d only upon clear and 
convincing eviden:ce, ibut he thereafter ;rule·d in effect 
that after all the jury wer·e not really the judges of the 
credibility of the witnesses, and after iall it wrus not really 
the jury who must 1be clearly convinced, and that their 
verdict must 'be set :aside as, to some defendants-not as 
to others_.booause the verdi>ct was ''against the weight 
of the evidence. '' 
We will ·here present enough of the re-coTd to show 
that the jury was not only amply justified in rejeeting 
the testimony of Bradley, Badger, MeDonough, 'T'anner 
and Earl, but was in good ~conscience required to do so. 
Briant 'S. B·adger, President of the plaintiff, 'an·d 
one of its organizers, wrus the first of plaintiff's offiC-ers 
to take the witnes·s s'tand. He s·orught upon direct exam-
ination, to leave the clear imp~re.ssion in the minds. of 
court and jury that ·th~e retail business in which he had 
embarked had 'been destroyed 'and irrevocably }orst he-
cause ~certain lines 'Of merch~andise~ had heen witfhdrawn 
hy Graybar Ele1ctric 'Company, ·s·alt Lake H~ard\vare 
Comp,any, Z. 'C. M. I. and Flint Distributing ·Comp,any. 
He centered his attack upon the Flint Distributing Com-
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p1any, ~and empha1sized the crip·pling ·effect of the loss of 
the Bendix Kelvinarbor 1and Zenith distributed by Flint. 
' It was thereafte~r made elear fbeyond disp,ute by ~pl,ain-
tiff's own witnes·se's that Flint Distri'buting Comp,any 
did not suggest the wi'thdrawal of Zenith piroducts, ibut 
on the eontr:ary urged P'laintiff to ~ontinue their purchas:e 
I 
and res'all:e '(Tr. 770, 771). It al'so was made t() 'ap·pear 
ibeyond dispute, and hy pilaintiff's own witnesses, that 
fue husiness ·done. by plaintiff in Zenith p~roducts far 
exceeded the total business done hy p~laintiff in all other 
Flint me:rchandis·e· ('Tr. 1198 to 1'200, 16:51, Ex. 53). It 
there,after developed that Badger ha~d not 'at all he·en 
foreed out of rthe appliance business. .On the contrary, 
he and ·Bradley were :doing business 'at the old 'Stand. 
He would hav.e. 'left the imp,ression with the jury that 
the· only sources of appliances were the four distributor 
defendants. It was later made to 'aJp~pe,ar without dispute 
fuat there were fifteen 'Oir twenty other ·di1strihutors in 
S'alt L:ake City who 'sold wide1y advertised and well 
re'cognized :electrical ap~pli,ances to retailers (Tr. 1940, 
20B2. to 2086). 
At the time of the trial Badger and Brrudley were 
conducting an 1ap,pliance 'store in plaintiff's old 'Stand 
and were and lrad 'been vigorously and persistently 'ad-
vertising their business (Ex. 7 ·to 23). Upon cross e~am­
irration of Badger, questions were asked for the purpose 
of el~eiting tihe admission that he and Bradley were still 
in the ap~plianee ~bu:sines's at 38 M~ain Street. A review 
of p1ages 9'2:3. 1and 9:24 of the record will,show how lacking· 
in candor and forthrightness was Mr. Biadge·r. 
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Upon cross examination B~adger was confronted 
''ith numerous newsp,ap·er advertisements p~ublis~hed by 
him and Bradley and ·advertising their appliance busi-
ness at 38 South Main S'treet ~during the ye,ar's 1949 
and 1950. It was even 'POinted out to Badger upon cross 
examination that he and Bradley were adverti,sing fo:r 
sale the very lines ·of merchandise. whi1ch he ~claimed 
were lost by the withdrawal of lines by the four dis~ 
tributor defendants. He 'admitted causing su~h 'adver-
tisements to he publi·shed, and was ·asked whether in 
fact ·he had in 'stock the merchandise he was ~advertising 
for ~sale. Hi'S 'answer to that question was ''Did we have 
to ,have it~" (Tr. "827, Ex. 19). 
The ~answer as 1above quoted shows a naiv.e: dis:regard 
by Mr. ·Badger ror the F'air ~Trade Laws of the ·State of 
Utah. 
'Section 16A-4~8 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
provides: ''It shall ·he unlawful ~fior any p~erson enga.ged 
in 'business within the State of Utah to advertise goods, 
wares or merichandi:S'e they 'are not p'rep,ared to s.up~p~ly.'' 
.&s a piart of p~raintiff''s ahnormal 'cutr:ate adver-
t:i:sing, it circulated thouSands 'Of carrds through the 
mail addressed to names secured from an extensive 
mailing list ~and asked ~ach recipient to S"end in to. the 
plaintiff the model and age of ·his w~s'hing machine.· 
This was ·requested with the P'romise that the p.el}son 
identifying hi's wrushing machine as the oldest washing 
m~hine of aN to respond would he given a new Easy 
Washer ('Tr. 895, 8916). It is made to appear hy the 
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testimony of the P'laintiff tfuat many 'hundreds~ of re-
Siponses werH teceived. "When suffi~ient time had pa;s,sed 
to bring -'this ,~o-cal1ed contest to a close, numerous p-er-
sons ealled plaintiff',s 'Store to inquire who ha.d won the 
was~her. Having re1ceived numerous such calls, and being 
I 
unable to rrrune for them the winner ·of the washing 
machine, ¥rs. 'Thorpe, ~a lady emp,loyee of the plaintiff 
inquired ~of Mr. Bradley, ''are you going to have a p~re­
sen·tation of thi'S was·her ~ '' To Which Bradley replied, 
'' Aroe. you kidding.'' H·e laughed, an~ she said, ''Have 
yoru given it~" And he sai~d, "No, we can't afford it." 
('Tr. 1'900, 1901). ·Tirat Bradley made the statement just 
quoted stands in the record without dispute. The only 
fair inference from this incident is that p~aintiff carried 
on a contest with never 'any intention of ke-ep,ing its part 
of 'the 'arrangement. Badger, as President of the pl'ain-
tiff, mus:t have known of this shady bit of business. 
In 1949 Badger filed a sworn s·tatement with 1fu.e 
assessor 'Of S'alt !Jake County stating ·the plaintiff's 
inventory as of J·anuary 1, 1949, ·at a value of $17,873.9'3 
(Ex. 49). That 1sworn st~tement was intended to be 
the ibasis for t·ax lirubili ty of the P'laintiff eorpoTa:tion. 
P 11aintiff introduced as evidence in thi'S case an exhibit 
p•replared :for ·the pruiipose~ o:f influencing the jury in its 
assessment of d'ama,ges. wherein its inventory ~as of 
Dec_ember 3.1, 19:48 was $50,422:.06, (Ex. AAA). The jury 
was justified in Te'j'ectin.g Badger -as -a convinicing witness, 
' but the court ·ha;s now rule~d that the jury was bound 
to :a.ccep~t his evidence as clear 1and convincing. 
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Bradley, like B·adger, went righ-t on with tfhe retail 
appliance business. at the pJ,aintiff's old stand, 38 S10u.tih 
Main ·Street, with scareely an interru.ption, yet 'he joined 
Badger in seeking damages against the defendants in 
the ·sum of $600,000.00. Bradley, like Badger, :and in 
cooperation with B·adger, pU!blicly advertise~d ~the 'Sale 
of merch'andise whi0h they did not have·. Bradley testi-
fied tlrat he did not h·ave notice that RCA .p~honograph 
records were f~air traded until January 6, 1949 ('Tr. 
1160). Plaintiff's own witnes's, Mrs. Thorpe, testified 
that formal noti~e. was !brought to Bradley and a.ssoci·ates 
on D·ooember 28, 1948. At the time· the, notices were 
brought to the s't'()lre Bradley was. '' kiS'sing one of the 
girls under the mistletoe'' (Tr. 1'902, 1903. Ex. 3'2:). 
Even 'Such an entertaining diversion eould not h·a;ve 
blinded him to the fact ~that ·a man came into the store 
and left fue notice· on the :eounter within only 1a few 
feet ·of Bradley. Mrs. 1Thorp~e testified that S1he knew 
of the fair trading of RC . A rooo~ds, ·and if she knew 
it certainly the jury was entitled to 'be1lieve under all 
the circumstances that Bradley knew it. 
For a long ti~me Bradley h·ad been directing the 
s:ale of RCA reeoT·ds in violation of the F·air Trade laws, 
and had ibee·n doing ·so hy the 1sale of !coupon hooks. 
I 
When Bruce: McKee, ·a reeor·d salesman for Salt Lake 
H·ardware, asked Bradley about the sale of coupon 
books, ·Bradley ·de.nied ·that he or his 'aSS'ociates we·re· 
se'lling coupon ·book!s ('Tr. 1949'). T'hat statement was 
clearly not true. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
50 
Bradley eaused a registered letter to be· sent to 
Harold H. Bennett 'On the 6th day of January, 1949· (Tr. 
1673, Ex. 54) stating that Briant ·s. Badger h·ad entirely 
severed his eonnection with the plaintiff. Shortly there-
after, :and on the ~2:2·nd ·day oif January, 1949, Br'adley 
and T·anner 'Called Ulpon Mr. Bennett in an effort to 
reestaJhlish dealings ~betwee,n p~aintiff and Z. C. M. I. in 
E·asy Washer~s. ('Tr. 167 4, 2127 et seq.)'. .O.n that day 
B·radley -and ·T'anner knew ~tlrat Badger had not Ieft 
p~aintiff, ibut was still its President. 'They thought Ben-
nett might resume ftle. sale of wrushers to ·Bradley if he 
thought B~adger was no longer involved. Upon that 
assump,tion they induced Mr. Bennett to believ-e that 
B~adger had retired from Uptown. They not 'only falsely 
and :affirmatiVie:ly represented that B'adger had left the 
plaintiff's busine!s1s, but conce!aled from B.ennett the 
fact that Tlanner had wctually resigned hi'S: office with 
p;laintiff and had arr:anged to resume empJo~ent with 
Wells., B1axte:r and Miller , ( 'T'r. 167:5). 
Bradley admitted that a major p·ericentage of busi-
, 
ness d:one hy p~a.intiff wiifu. Flint was in Zenith radios, 
and that Flint agreed plaintiff eould 'CJontinue tn 1seTI 
Zenith ;at ·all of plaintiff's outlets, and yet B·radley would 
have 'hrud the jury ibelieve that Flint ruined p1laintiff 
fby refusing to s~ell merchundise to it. 
Bradley and McDonough e~neour'a.ge.d Mrs. 1Thorpe, 
manager of their recor1d dep,artme·nt, to seeure empioy-
ment laJS manager of Robert Nevins' record dep,a,rtment. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
51 
X eYins is one of t~he defendan~ts, and Bradley an'd 
McD·onough urged ~Irs. Tho11p1e to enter ~ evins emp~loy 
as · · :Jia.ta. Hari'' and thereafter sp~y on Nevins and turn 
over to them confidential information from Nevins' 
files. They urged her ''to load Nevins up' with records 
and then quit !him" ('Tr. 1140). 
Bradley admitted that after counsel ·had been em-
ployed to 'bring this action he and counsel had "recon-
stru~ted the converS'ations" ('Tr. 1188 to 119'2) upon 
whi,ch plaintiff relied at the trial for re'covery. McDon-
ough j'Oined with Bradley in an effort to hrrbe Mrs. 
Thorpe to get the confidence of Robert Nevins, and 
then abuse it by turning 'Over confidential information 
to them (Tr. 1139). 
'T'he fourth of pilaintiff',s frour officers to testify 
was Tanner. He had been trained in the ·high ethics of 
his pirofession, 'hut upon the witnes1s stand he was indeed 
a sorry figure. 
Tanner was invited into the enterp~rise because· of 
his sup~pos·ed 'Skill and 'ability in the p!roper keep~ing of 
:financial records. After this suit was file;d 'T,anner he·gan 
the p~rep,aratron of finanei~al exhlbits to sustain the p~lain­
tiff's demands. In order to make the financial records 
which he :had made in the regul~ar eourse of business 
stand Ulp as support for ·the comp,laint he round it ne1ces-
sary or conve·nie-nt to make 99 changes in the re~ords 
_I 
('T·r. 1390). He never kep1t a physical invoentory which 
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Is necessary in ·aecO:rdance with the standards. o:f his 
p~rofes'Sion if a .correct financial hrs'tory of the enter:prise 
is to be maintained. 
While on eross. examination Tanner was confronted 
with 'a financial statement which he, as p·rin'cipal aecount-
ing officer and treasurer of the p~laintiff, had given to 
a credit organization to refleet pl•aintiff's financial con-
dition as of NoiVemher '30, 1'948. He admitted that the . 
statement was ·given fio~ the purpose of maintaining 
and securing -credit ('Tr. 16;68). He admitted that the 
statement railed to di1selose app•roximately $30,708.68 of 
a!ccounts. p1ayable (iTr. 116153). When asked if the omi·s,sion 
of those accounts p•ayable wa:s in accordance with the 
standards and ethi'cs ·of his p·rofes:sion, he stated if he 
had certified the statement as a Certified Puhlic Account-
ant he would have heen iborund to include the a;ecounts 
payable, but inasmuch ·as he was not certifying the 
statement ·he felt at liberty to omit the accounts payable 
('Tr. 169·5). It will he· remembered that the aJccount·s pay-
able wh~ch were· omitted totalled in dollars almost double 
the amount of !p[aintiff's entire· capital. The· only per-
missible inference from T·anner's testimony was that 
aecording to his morro standards ·as long as he did not 
certify ia statement to 'he true, he was free to he dis-
honest with his. creditor's and p•rosp~ective creditors. 
Early in the, year 19~49 'T:anner prep,ared a statement 
for the ·C,onnty Ass·e'Ssor which was signe~d under oath 
by Badger, President of plaintiff cor·poration. The 
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statement ,, ... as prepared and sworn to :Dor the purpose 
of giving the County Assessor ·a basis for asses'sing 
taxes against the p•laintiff corporation. The statement 
so prepared by Tanner (Ex. 49) ·and sworn to by Badger 
fi.."'{ed the plaintiff's inventory •as of January 1, 1949, 
at $17,873.93. In an ·exhibit {AAA) 1prep~ared for the 
trral of this cas.e by Mr. Jeffs from the hooks kep~t by 
Tanner, the inventory of p~aintiff as of the same time 
was shown at more than $50,000.00. That exhibit was 
submitted for the purpose of showing the value of 
plaintiff's business on January 1, 19·49, as a hasis for 
the measurement of damages hy the jury. This conflict 
was s.ubmitted to Tanner shortly lbe~oTe the noon reces·s. 
His immediate reaction was reflected by his voluntary 
statement that it was "'apparently an error" (Tr. 
1622). When foreed to answer whethe!r he thought it 
was honest to give one sworn ~statement to the County 
Asses'Sor for tax. p~urposes ·and 'another entirely different 
sworn statement as to the firm's, financial condition f.O:r 
the purpos-e 'Of proving damages, he :fin:ally s-uggested 
that it woul·d he all right to leave out the statement 
prepared for the trial (Tr.l6·98). 
In January ·of 1'949, 'T,anner and Bradley, as officers 
of plaintiff, -called upon Harold H. Bennett, rus M·anrager 
of Z. ·C. M. I., in the hope of inducing Bennett to resume 
business relations with 1pJaintiff. Although 'T1anner and 
Bradley ·did husiness just across the· street from Ben-
nett';s office, they had recently, before ~ailling upon Ben-
nett, sent Bennett ·a registere:d letter (Ex. 54) to the 
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effect that B~adger was no, longer in any way conne'cted 
wrth Jil:aintiff. When they called upon Mr. Bennett they 
knew that the 'le~tter 1fuey had S'ent him wrus not true, 
but they intended to leave Bennett with the impression 
that Badger was no longer eonnected with plaintiff. 
Bennett had neve:r met Badger, and he asked Bradley 
and Tanner why they ·had sent him the letter. ·T,anner 
replied that they al'l knew that th.eir business difficulties 
had resulte:d from Badger's queer ideas of conducting 
a busine'sis, and ·they thought that if Bennett believed 
that Badger was no longer ·connected with them he would 
resume sup,plying merchandise CTr. 2'127 to 2129). And 
yet the trial eourt now rules that the jury wa;s com-
p~elled to believe and he convinJced by 'Tanner and 
Bradle·y. 
The 'Course 'Of ~de:aling between plaintiff and Glenn 
Earl has heretof:ore been summarized. Glenn Earl was . 
thrust forwa,r:d ·at the trial by pl'aintiff as its ace witneS's. 
It was p~laintiff's hope that through Glenn Earl the 
jury could ibe convinced that E:arl and other distriibuto~s 
had been induced to ;alte:r their relations with p~laintiff 
because of concerted acts of the· dealers. He was upon 
the witneS1S stand ror the 'better piart of a ·week, and a 
review of his testimony in ·detail will demonstrate what 
a weak and unreli~alble sup1port he wa:s for p~laintiff's 
case. It will he made p~lain that he was the genesis of 
p~aintiff's business ·difficulties. He was -caught with a 
stoc;k of obsolete merc:handise Which he disposed of hy 
imposition upon the plaintiff. He sought to and did 
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transfer the results of his hnp~rovi·dent purchases up~on 
the inexperienced offi1cers of p1l'aintiff. He would ha:ve 
had the jury believe. that plaintiff's business difficulties 
arose from pressure exerted by retailerts in Salt Lake 
City. On cross examination he admitted that as a dis-
tributor he \Va;s free to sell to retai'l outlets exclusively 
aceording to his O\Vll judgment and decision. He admitte·d 
that he was rat li!herty to appoint retail outlets and to 
cancell retail outlets. a:s his busines·s judgme·nt dictated. 
Among those ·authorized to sell his p~roducts at re-
tail were the plaintiff, Frank Warren 'and ·the 'Summer-
hays :Jiusic C·omp,any. ·On dirieet e·xamination he testi-
fied that he had eancelied the licenses of plaintiff, Frank 
Warren and Summerhays Musrc C·ompany. He volun-
teered the stateme·nt upon the witness stand that he can-
celled those licen·se·s to demonstrate ''that he. -could not 
be pushe·d around.'' He· testified in effect that he ran 
his own business and wanted to make it clear that he 
would not b·e the vietim of dealer pressure ( Tr. 1333). 
:Subsequently he testified that he had ~ancelled the 
licenses of plaintiff, Frank Warren and Summerhays 
because of dealer p·ressure. Thus, his suhsequen t testi-
mony was in direct conflict with his earlier testimony 
upon the s-ame sU!hject. His 'testimony on the two dif-
ferent occasions was. in f·a;ct irreconcilable. He was 
I 
pressed upon eross examination to reconcile the conflict. 
Hi1s answer was that 'he had changed his statement after 
counsel had cal'led that testimony to his attention ('Tr. 
13'32, 13'33) . 
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Earl made· much upon direct e~amination of what he 
ch.'~racterized .. as thre.ats upon the p1art of E. ~- Royle 
Company -and :The Paris ·Comp,any to advertise RCA 
products Rt ·a discount as. long as. P'laintiff wa:s p~ermitted 
to· do ;so~ H·e testified that it· was: his volicy ·as a dis.tri-
butor, ·and the· p,o!Jicy ·of- Radio Corporation of America 
to fioribid 'advertising o.f RJCA p~roducts at a di'scount. It 
. I 
wa~ the~ pointed out to -~irn upon cross examiri~t~ion that 
· plaintiff had heen broadcasting over the facilities of a 
local hroa:dcasting 'compHny that any listener who could 
guess.' the name of a well known tune could buy an RCA 
radio at a heavy discount. It was also point~d out to him 
thltt p~aintiff had heen ·resorting to various and devious 
me~ans . of 'bringing knowledge to the public that RCA 
r~adio1s could be pur~chaJsed at p~aintiff's store :at a di·s-
count. He even admitted that he had been piarticiprating 
in the exp·ense of plaintiff's p·romotion, an.d that the cO'st 
of the P'articiJp1ation was charged upon his hooks !3JS. ·~ad-· 
verti'Sing. When. probed as, to why, in view of his an-
noilllced policy forbidding advertising R,CA products 
·at 'a 'dis-count, he wolild permit p·laintiff to indulge in the 
p.romotions 'We have· des'crihed and at the same· time for-
Ibid Royle and others from meeting the comp,etition of 
P'laintiff ·by :advertising RC:A in!struments 'and records 
at a dis~orunt, his 'an'SW~:r wa~ that the sales p~romotions 
conducte-d by p~airttiff were not advertising, but were 
''games of skill'' :(
1
Tr. 1'302:). 
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Such hedging ·and weasling by the witness could he 
ca1eulated only to discredit him before the jury, an.d yet 
the trial court has ruled t'hat the jury was boun·d to accept 
hin1 as a clear and convincing witness. 
,, ... e invite the court's attention to the ca·se of Jack-
man v. Lawrence Drilling Co., 187 P. 258, wherein the ·Sn-
f!Jreme Court of Kansas stated that the requirement that 
proof be clear and· convincing means, '' 'Th·a.t the· evidence 
should ibe clear, that it is not ·ambiguous, doubtful, equi-
vocal or contradictory, and should be persp~icuoU:s and 
pointed to the issue under investigation; and. satis-
f·actory in the 'Sense that the source from wh~ch it comes 
is of such a creditruh1e- nature that the court and jury as 
men of ordinary intelligence, discretion ·and eaution m~a.y 
repose eonfidence in it. Ahsolut~ certainty is, o:f course, 
not required.'' The testimony of B:adger, Bradley, Mc-
Donough, Tanner and Earl failed to square with any of 
the standards set forth by the ·Sup.reme Court of Ka.nsa:s. 
And yet, the trial court ha;s ruled that the jury wa.s 
bound to 1be clearly ~convinced by the testimony oif ~all of 
those witnesses, .and that unti·l p~laintiff',s demands for 
damages in the sum of $600,000.00 is satisfied justice 
will have mi·s'earried. 
More needs to be said of the witness Mrs. Arva 
Thorp~e, also ealled Toni Thorpe. She was the manager 
of plaintiff's phonograph record dep~artment from Aug-
ust, 1948, until January ·22, 19·49· ('T·r. 1088). As such she 
was at the M~ain ·Street store ·during all business hours, 
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and in frequent -contact each ·day with Badger, Bradley, 
McDonough and :T:anner. Ap~parently she had made some 
contact with defendant Nevins ('Tr. 1096) and with the 
defendant Bigelow ('Tr. 1089 to 1091) while still em- . 
p~loyed hy the !plaintiff. 'The su!bject of empJoyment w·as 
discussed between her and Nevins and with Bigelow. Ap--
p~arently P'laintiff construed those contacts as evidence 
that Nevins and Bigelow were trying to impair plain-
tiff's business hy offering employment to Mrs. Thorp·e. 
At 'any rate, that seems to he the purpose £or which she 
was sworn and vouched for lb~ P'laintiff. 
But upon ·cross examination Mrs. Thorp-e gave evi-
dence which ·characterize,d P'laintiff's entire ·ease i-p. gen-
eral, and P'lainti'ff's witnesses Bradley ·and McDonough 
in p:artiicular, as heing entirely unrelia:hle and unconvin~ 
ing. She te'Stified that in the early part of J·anuary, while 
she was still an emp,loyee of p~laintiff, Bradley and ~{}. 
D~onough engaged her in conViersation during which they 
informed he:r that they were contemplating a suit against 
Robert Nevins ·and others. They encouraged he·r to iseek 
and aceept employment with Mr. Nevins, and in thi1S 
conneet~on told her that if she would gain the eonfidence 
of 1\!r. Nevins ~and produce: evidence to support their laMT-
suit it would he worth $1,000.00 to her (Tr. 113:9'). :She 
was urged to 'gain N e'Vins' confidence ~and then ·'bring 
!back 'confi~dential information to the· pJaintiff . .&s she put 
it, fue,y ·sugge,sted that she- o~pe·rate as a "M·ata Hari" 
('Tr. 1140). :Sher did ·aJ,ecep:t emp,loyment with Mr. Ne-vins, 
J 
but her conseience prevented her from op~eratin.g as 
'' Mata. H~ari. '' 
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·She "~as a'bout to relate an exp,erience with Warwick 
C. Lamoreaux one of plaintiff's :counsel. 'The trial Judge 
refused to let the jury hear her testimony in that con-
nection, but in the absence ·of the jury she testified that 
after she had been in Nevins' empJoy for ·some weeks 
she received a telephone call from Mr. Lamore·aux invit-
ing her to lunch. She \vas frightened about the matter, 
hut with 'Some misgivings, ·she a;ccepte·d the invi·tation and 
took lunch with Mr. Lamoreaux at a down town ~afe. 
I 
l\fr. Lamoreaux asked her if Mr. Nevins was ·a p1arty to 
any conspiracy and she stated, '''To the hest of my knowl-
edge he was not.'' ( Tr. 1100). He urgHd her to gain addi-
tional information from Nevins and she rep,lied thlllt she 
was frightened and wasn't interested in getting addi-
tional information. She did, h!orwev.er, p·romise that she 
wouJ.d see him again. 
While they were together she mis'Sed one of her gloves. 
While looking £or it she ohs·erved that L:amoreaux held 
it in his h·and. He tos1sed it hack on the t~bJe. When she 
endeaV<ored to p~lace it upon her hand she discovered a 
ten-dollar hill folded within it. When Lamoreaux re-
turned the glove he stated, ''There wiH be more of this, 
and we will take care of you, hut we can't meet in pillb~ic 
from now on." {Tr. 1101). 
Ther·e is real flavor to that episode. While the jury 
wa'S not perrn.itted to hear it, the jury di·d hear enough 
from the lips of Mrs. Thorpe to clearly indicate the la~ck 
of good faith in plaintiff's entire case. The trial Judge 
heard that 'Statement •and yet he ruled in effeet that plain-
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tiff's case· was hound to he alqcep~ted by the jury as clear 
and -convincing, and that until praintiff p~revails there will 
be a nrisearriage of justice. 
Plaintiff 'offered other witnesses whos~e testimony 
related to iS'olated incidents and is of little or no signifi-
cance, ·exeept for the testimony of Rulon Jeffs, an ac-
countant who was employed by plaintiff to audit its 
books. He came up with some interesting sidelights. 
First, he had to reeonstru·ct the· adcounting whi~h- had 
J 
heen·kep~t by Mr. Tanner and reach his conclusions by ref-
erence to work sheets rwhich Tanner had ·made from the 
ibooks. One small incident revealed by ·T!anner would he 
really humorous if it ·did not diselose such a complete lack 
of good faith un the p~art of plaintiff. Plaintiff detailed 
upon exhibits the items of loss which· it alleged it had 
sustained 1hy the unlawful conduct of defendants. .Among 
the items going to make up the $'200,000.00 damage was 
one for $10.00 p~aid for the. rental up~on a casket. After 
this suit had 'been brought plaintiff S'ought to inflame 
the· ·public again:st the defendants by garish and drama-
tic display in its show windows. It posted parts of its 
complaint in the show windows, and exhibited a casket 
with dry skull ·an·d magpie ~rus sUlp1porting seenery. This 
was accomp,anied hy funeral music played over the~ir 
loud 'Speake·r, an·d hy remarks made for the purpose of 
gaining symp,athy for themselves and hostility for the 
defendants. For the use of that casket as ~a show window 
exhj!bit p~laintiff p·aid a rental of $10.00. It sought in this 
lawsuit to recover from the defe·ndants the cost of that 
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morbid exhibit. Any $10.00 item as such would he of 
small cons·equence, but tl1is $10.00 item was a tip off to 
the shady chal'lacter of plaintiff's entire laws-uit ('Tr. 
1511, 1512). 
The fabric of plaintiff's elaim of conspiracy was 
woven around certain conversations alleged to have taken 
plae:e with and concerning plaintiff and its officers. Chi·ef 
reliance ".,.a:s rested upon two conversations between 
Leland B. F·Iint, of Flint Distributing Comp~any, and 
Harold H. Bennett, M·anager of Z. C. M. I. It was claime'd 
that. Flint, having withdrawn certain merchandi·s·e from 
plaintiff called uJpon Bennett and that Z. C. M. I. shortly 
thereafter withdrew Easy Washers from resale. by the 
plaintiff. Plaintiff was then p·ermitted to offer evidence 
of numerous conversations alleged to have heen had at 
various times and places with salesmen of Z. C. M. I. 
All such -conversations were offered and re~eive·d to 
support the charge of :conspirooy between Flint and Z. 
C. M. I. to rwhich it was alleged other defendants had at-
tached themselves. 
The jury found ther:e was no conspiracy. The court, 
hy its order, ·acquiesced in the jury's finding that 
Z. C. M. I. was no piart of any consp~iracy. It rrow having 
been adjudicated that Z. ·C.. M. I. was no p1art of any 
conspiracy, all hears•ay receive·d in evidence to conne•ct 
Z. ·C. M. I. with th·e alleged conspiracy would, upon an-
other trial, he incompetent and inadmissible against any 
of the remaining defendants. It i's :tnost earnestly sub .... 
mitted that a revie·w of the entire record will show that 
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a conspirator. And if Flint was not a eonspirator there 
was no eonslpU.racy among any distributors because it is 
now finally adjudicated by order of the ·court that Gray-
bar Electric and S·alt Lake Hardware, like Z. C. M. I. are 
not consp·irators. 
Reams of hearsay testimony relating to ~statements 
made iby S'alesmen and re~presentatives of Gray'har Elec-
tri'C c:omp,any and 'Salt Lake Hardware Comp·any were 
received in evidence· in sup~port of p·lain tiff's theory that 
the three -companies just mentioned were engaged in a 
conspiracy. It having heen judicially settled that they 
were not so engaged, most of that testimony would he 
entirely incompetent upon another trial. 
Pl·aintiff's ·claim for damages is brused upon the 
theory that its business was ruin·ed because merchandise 
distributed fby Graybar Electric, Z. C. M. I., Salt Lake 
Hardware, and Flint was withdrawn. It is now deter-
mined that Graybar, Z. 1C. M .. I., ~and Salt L:ake Hardware 
lawfully withdrew their merchandise, and in all the vast 
record made helow there is nothing to indicate that any 
withdrawal of merchandise (by Flint ruine·d, or could have 
ruined, P'l•aintiff's. bU!siness. :The reeord shows quite the 
contrary. 
After Flint and the p·laintiff ceased to do business 
with each other, plaintiff informed Harold H. Bennett 
that if p•laintiff got the E·a:sy Washers hack it could make 
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a suooess of its business ( Tr. 1166). The record also 
sho\\~s that Flint did not 'vithd:vaw his merchandise from 
plaintiff tT·r. 19!68, 770). 
Flint refused to 1p1ermit the sale of certain of his 
lines through the Pierpont warehouse, but he agreed to 
the continued sale of Zenith radios at all of p~laintiff's 
outlets, and agreed to the continued sale of Bendix and 
Kelvinator products at the Main Street and State Street 
stores of plaintiff, respectively. Plaintiff rejected all of 
the Flint lines .upon the ground that they no longer 
trusted Flint. Zenith radios were the dominating Flint 
merchandise in plaintiff's orperation, and Flint urged 
plaintiff to keep them and to continue to sell them ('Tr. 
768, 1020, 1154). It is now adjudicated that whatever Wlts 
done iby Graybar Electric, Z. ·C. M. I. and Salt L:ake 
Hardware was ·done for lawful reasons of their own, 
and was not done in furtherance of any conspiracy 
among themselves, or with Flint, or with .anyone else. 
Note certain o.f the court's instructions on this aspe1ct 
of the case: 
I nstructiorn No. 8. 
A. Plaintiff did not have· the right to re·-
quire the defendants, or any of them, to sell to it 
mer.ehandise for re·Hale at the Pierpont Street 
warehouse, or at any trade area not of the choos-
ing of such defendant or in a location not p·ro:vided 
for 'by agreement. 
B. You are also instructed that a person or 
eorp·ora.tion in private enterp~rise has no right to 
refuse to ~sell to ~another p1erson if such refusal 
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is made- for the purpose of furthering a conspiracy 
or combination to fix or maintain P'rices or a con-
'spir:~cy t101 cut off a person's supp·lies for the pur-
pose of lessening competition. 
'C. !The defendant distributors were at lib-
erty (if they .were not intending to aid in a com-
bination in restraint of trade), to cancel any s·ales 
agreement and stop· 'selling any merchandise to 
plaintiff whenever the- sales p·ractice·s of plaintiff 
· became embarrassing to them in the ·o~perationand 
-conduct of their respective businesses, or for any 
other re~son p•e-rso~al to the defendants acting in-
dividually. !Such defendant distributors had the 
right to determine for themselves whether further 
sale's of merchandise of any kind to !plaintiff 
woruld he- to their best interests. Such a decision 
to stop· selling to the plaintiff.hy such ·defendants, 
if ructing independently .therein, would he lawfUl. 
D. If any defendant ·distributor felt that the 
trade P'ractices of the· pJaintiff were injurious to 
the business of the said ·defendant or for any 
reason or for no reason at all, acting :solely iby 
itself and upon its own initiative, the said 'distri-
butor could refuse to sell to the· p~ainti'ff, that is, 
~as long as itg re·fusal. was not a part of a comJhina-
tion with others to act together in restraint of 
trade. 
In his ruling upon P'laintiff',s motion for a new trial 
the court found no fault with the aho¥e instructi:on. When 
Flint authorized the sale by plaintiff of his merchandise 
plaintiff had no o~eration on Pierpont ~Street. When 
Flint discovered that his merelrandise was being sold 
through the warehouse on Pierpont he h·ad the right to 
·determine for himself whether he would permit the sale 
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of all or any of his lines through that outlet. He deter-
mined that he could not permit his Bendix and Kelvinator 
lines to ·be so sold. At the same time he concluded that 
he would pern1it the sale of Zenith radios at the ware-
house. The record is clear beyond any substantial dis-
pillte that Flint's de·cision in th·at ·particular did not and 
could not unlawfully affect plaintiff's business. It is 
equally clear that Flint's ~decision was not hased upon 
anything done or ·omitted by any 'dealer. 
An effort was made by plaintiff to prove that Flint's 
decision with respect to plaintiff was foreed by The Paris 
·Company which sold Flint's Kelvinator and Zenith 
products at retail. What occurred between Flint and 
. The P;aris C·omp~any is wholly without dispute in the 
record. It was the testimony of the Vice President of 
The Paris C·ompany that it was the historical poliey of 
his store to find ·out at all times what his competition 
was, and then to meet it. He was told that p~laintiff wa:s 
selling Zenith radios at a discount. To !confirm that. in-
formation he caused one ~of his employees to ''shop'' 
plaintiff in aecordance with the estahlishe·d p~ractice of 
retail merchants. As a result a Zenith :r1adio was !prur-
chas·ed from the p;laintiff hy 'The Paris Company at a 
sll!bstantial discount. The Paris Company did not then 
comp·lain either to Flint or to the p·laintiff. On the con-
trary, and in ·accordance with its usual custom, The p:aris 
Company published an advertisement in a Salt L:ake 
paper offering to sell Zenith radios at a discount suffi-
cient to meet p•laintiff's competition. After the advertise-
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ment app·eared Flint called upon The Paris Company 
and stated that the p~laintiff did not like 'The Paris ·Com-
p,any's p~rice cutting on Zenith. The r~ply was that 'The 
Paris 'Company was simply meeting plaintiff's competi-
tion, and Flint was handed the s~ale'S ti~ket eovering the 
purchase 'oif the radio from the plaintiff. That is all there 
was to that -conversation between Flint and 'The Paris 
Company respecting the pJairrtiff (Tr. 1070 to 1075). 
On another occasion Mr. Dreyfous of 'The Paris 
·Comp~any, inquired of Flint whether Kelvinator prod-
ucts were· being sold by the plaintiff through the Pierpont 
warehouse. Flint's reply was "No," and that wrus the 
extent of that conversation ('Tr. 1068, 1069). Wh·en asked 
why he inquired of Flint whether Kelvinator was being 
sold through plaintiff's warHhouse, Dreyrorus r•eplied, 
''I wanted to know where our com·petition wa;s.'' (Tr. 
1069). 
;The foregoing reflects all the record with respect 
to any !contacts between Flint 'and Th.e Piaris Comp~any, 
relating to the pJaintiff, an·d yet the trial corurt has ruled 
that the· jury was bound to he clearly convinced that a 
conspiracy existed between Flint and ·The Pari'S C'om-
p:any. There never w1as ani!J clear amd convincing evidence 
of the existence of '01YIIY co1Vsvpiracy. With three of the 
four distr:i!butors definitely and permanently out of the 
case, all hearsay testimony tending to tie those distribu-
to·rs to any -conspiracy would he ineomp~etent upon an-
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other trial. It would indeed be ;a mis:earriage of j·ustie:e 
to subject these a.ppell~ants to the expense of another 
trial. 
III. 
(a) The record of the trial below will show that the 
granting of a new trial as to these appellants and each 
of them, was arbitrary, capricious and ,an abuse of dis-
cretion. 
(ib} The record will show that the granting of a 
new trial ·did not result from the e~ercise of sound judi-
cial discretion, but rather from prejudiee and bias in 
favor of plaintiff, or ;p,laintiff's counsel, or against de-
fendants, or their counsel, which p~rejudice ·and bias was 
shown p~rior to and during the trial of the case. 
All of counsel for all of the :defendants were 'Oif the 
opinion that J·udge Jeppson was so far hiase·d as to 
justify an appli;cation for his disqua.lifieation ·as trial 
Judge. 
January 3, 19150, the ·day upon which the trial began, 
was the first day upon rwhich rule ·63 ('h) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil P'rocedure 1became applicable·, and upon that day 
all attorneys for all defendants joined in an Affidavit 
of Bias, 'Certificate of Cnunsel, and App,lication for Dis-
qualifieation of Judge ('Sup,ra. Page./.~_, Tr. 101-104). 
The bias o:f the trial Judge up to and including the 
trial was over:come by the verdict of the jury in favor 
of all of these aplpellants, hut we urge that bias persisted 
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after the trial and that ib~as rather than sound judicial 
' discr:etion resulted in the granting of a new trial as to 
these appellants. 
Because we take this position we feel hound to as-
sume the unp,leasant duty of pointing out wherein the 
record supports the charge of bias upon the p~art of the 
trial Judge. 
It will be remembered that plaintiff filed its com-
p,laint in F'ebruary, 1949. The parties were fin~lly at 
issue upon p~laintiff':s third amended :complaint, and coun-
sel wer·e noticed to appear before Judge Jelp~pson on 
November ·9, 1949·, fo·r a ·setting of the case for trial. On 
that day Judge Jeppson had the case 'before him and 
announced to eoung.el that he would have to dispose of 
the ease promp,tly 'beeause he would not he trying con-
tested eases after January 1, 19·50 CTr. 267). There was 
no ap~parent reason why he should have felt under any 
special duty to try this particular case. · His determina-
tion to hold onto the ease and try it without regard to the 
convenience of the parties 'became clearer from day to 
day as he had !COunsel 'before him upon p~re-trial matters. 
Having· announced on November 9, 1949, that he 
would not he trying contested cases after January 1, 
1950, he set the -case ror trial on December 1'2, 1949, and 
called a p·re-trial for Novem1ber 28th CTr. 306, 307). 
O·n N o:v;embe·r 28th, counsel for defendants moved 
for postponement of the trial until afte·r January 1, 
19'50, and urged that Decemlher was the busiest month of 
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the year for merchants, and that a trial in December 
would impose a heavy hardsh]p, upon defendants. At that 
point Judge J·eppison again called attention to the change 
in trial judge personnel which would 'be'come effective 
after January 1, 19'50 ('Tr. 309·) and indieated his deter-
' mination to hold onto the case and try it before rotation 
in judicial p·ersonnel took him away from the trial of 
contested matters. 
On November 28, 19~9, plaintiff was permitted to 
make certain formal amendments to its third amended 
complaint and suggested its intention to make further 
substantial amendments. D·efendants ohj·ected to the 
allowance of any further ·amendments. At that point de-
fendant!s renewe·d their request for a continuance until 
after January 1st. ~Such r~equest was again urverruled 
(Tr. 308 to 330). A further pre-trial hearing was called 
before Judge Jepps·on for Decemlber 5, 19'49. ·On that day 
plaintiff p·ro1p10sed substantial amendments to its third 
amended comp~laint as ·amended. Defen·dants ohjeeted to 
the allowance of such amendments. 'The Judge then 
orde'red p·laintiff to serve its prop·osed amendments upon 
defendants and shortened the time to ohject to the amend-
ments to three days. At that time the Judge moved the 
trial date from De[cemher 1'2', up, to December 27 ('Tr. 9·4). 
Again defendants urged ·a postponement of the case until 
after the first of the year, and again the motion was 
denied. 
On December 9, 1949, Judge Jep·pson, orver the oh-
je:ction of the :defendants, allowed further and substan-
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tial amendments to p~laintiff's third amended complaint 
as amended. At the same time he denied the motron of 
Graybar Electric Company and Z. C. M. I. to be allorwed 
to counterclaim against the plaintiff ('Tr. 97). Having, on 
December 9th, allowed substantial amendments to plain-
tiff's third amended comlp1aint, as amended, Judge Jep-
p·son, upon his own motion, and without any showing 
whatsoever, made his order requiring all defendants to 
p1lead to plaintiff's third amended complaint, as amended, 
before D·ececmJher 16th, 19·49 ('T'r. 893). !This was a short-
ening of the time allowed by law without any showing 
whatever of any urgency, except the Judge's determina-
tion to try the case. 
On the afte-rnoon of the last day of the shortened 
time, Z. C. M. I., ·The Paris Company and R,eed Bigelow 
filed their several demurrers to plaintiff's third 
amended comp~laint as ~amended. After the ~ourt had 
permitted the pJaintiff to make the amendments to its 
third amended eomp·laint at the p·re-trial hearing on D·e-
cember 1'6·, 19·49, Harold R. Boyer, counsel for Leland B. 
Flint and Flint Distributing Comp~any, two of the de-
fendants in the ease, made a motion that the case he 
strick!en from the trial calendar upon the ground that the 
same was not then at issue. This motion was joined in by 
the other def~ndants .and was summarily ·denied by the 
C1ourt (Tr. 404, 405). Paul H. Ray, one o:f counsel for 
defendants, was engaged befor.e a state commission on 
the day those demurrers were filed. He ap~p·eared in 
Judge Je1p~pson 's court just before 5:00 o 'elock P.M., the 
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usual ti1ne for evening recess. Court \vas then in session. 
At twenty nunutes to six Judge J ep;pson called up for 
argument the demurrers which had just that a.fternoon 
been filed. Ray stated to the court that he was entitled 
to the statutory notice c:alling up, matters for argument. 
The court then announced that the demurrers would he 
argued then and there or vvould be forthwith overrule,d 
without argument. The following excerp~t from the re-
cord illustrates the bias of the court: 
'' ThlR. PAUL RAY: I was not able to get 
here until late. I was at a hearing at the Cap~itol 
till four o'clock. I did not hear the order your 
Honor made which brings these demurrers on for 
hearing at this time, without notice. 
"·THE 1C:O,URT: I entered .an order that 
they he heard at this time, he-cause the time before 
the trial is so short it would almost ne:eessitate a 
continuance of the -case to get them heard. 
":The only ohj.ection I have heard is that 
counsel has not had time to p~re:pare the argu .. 
ment.s. 
"MR. PAUL RAY: Well, I want to make 
the record as ~clear as I ean. I don't think that 
counsel has to give any reasons why he is entitled 
to stand upon his statutory rights; and before we 
make any p~resentation of this demurrer I want to 
1be unde,rstood that it is ·done upon the order of the 
court; that if it is not done now, there would he 
no other time to do it. 
''THE 'COURT: !The order of the court is 
that the, demurrer he argued at this time, and the 
court will be p~rep~ared to rule on it when you com-
plete your argument. 
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'.'MR. P'AUL RAY:. The defendants,.P.aris 
Company, Z. C. M. I. and.Bigelow take exception 
to the order of the court. 
_ ''So· that my record may be quite compJete, I 
call your Honor's attention to the fact that the 
statutory time has not heen given us to p~lead, and 
there ·is no, evidence or no 'Showing of any notice 
from ~pJain tiff's · -counsel. 
''The· ·statute gives. us ten days to plead. Y.our 
Honor shortened that, over our objection. It is 
now twenty minutes to six in the afternoon, which 
is forty· minutes beyond the ~ustomary time to 
hold ·court. 
' ' No showing has been made that tltere is any 
emergency in this case; no showing made in thi·s 
cas.e that anylbody will suffer if the case is not 
tried on the 27th of D·ecemher. ·There is nothing in 
this reeord which indicates that the defendants' 
rights should be sacrificed :for the convenience of 
plaintiffs. 
''I will p~resent what we have to say, in con-
ne'Ction with this demurrer, under duress of the 
·court''S order which depirives me of my time to 
p~lead, or the statutory not~!ce to which I am en-
titled. 
'''T·HE C·O·URT': You may p·roceed. I think 
that is clear. 
''MR. PAUL: RAY: I did not he·ar what 
your Honor said. 
"!T,HE CO·URT': You may p~roceed. I think 
that is -clear. 
·''MR. PAUL RAY: I am p~articularly inter-
ested, if the court P'lease, in . their allegations that 
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fl3 
except for a conspiracy, this firm would have done 
a volume of business, four years from now-
(Argument on demurrer.) 
'''THE C·OURT: ·The demurrers are over-
ruled. ' ' ( Tr. 434, 435) . 
All pending motions ·were on that day overruled and 
denied, and all defendants again joined in a motion for 
continuance upon the ground that the case was not then 
at issue. :nfotion for continuance was denied, and again 
Judge Jeppson, upon his own motion, shortened the time 
within which ·defendants might answer plaintiff's third 
am~nded complaint, .as amended. Instead of allowing the 
statutory ten-day period, he re·duced the time to answer 
to three days and in some :caHes four days from the time 
the plaintiff's amendments were filed ('Tr. 9'9). 
Thereafter counsel for plaintiff and defendants 
stipulated for a postponement of the trial from December 
27, 19·49, to January 3, 1950 (:Tr. 448). 
When court OJ)ened on January 3, 1950, all of counsel 
for defendants p·resented their affi,davit for disqualifica-
tion in accordance with Rule ·63(ib) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The court criti:cized CTr. 456·) counsel 
for not filing the affidavit earlier, although he well knew 
that that was the first day upon which Rule ·63{b) was 
available and applicabJe. 
'The court then referred to that portion 'Of the affi-
davit in which it is stated that "normally, by reason of 
the rules and p~r~ctices of the Judges of the Third Judi-
1 
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cial District Court in and ~or Salt Lake County, ·State of 
Utah, certain cases would, as of this date, he assigned 
before an entirely different Judge, and that as of this 
date the said Honorable J osepih G. J epps'On would not 
have assigned to him in regular course the trial of con-
troverted matters,'' and having refe·rred to such state-
ment the Judge characterized it as not true (Tr. 4!50). 
He made that eharge of falsehood against all the defend-
ants' counsel, notwithstanding he had stated from the 
ibench on N ovemlber 9th, and again on November ·28th, 
that after J.anuary 1st he would not he available for the 
trial of contested matters ('Tr. 2:67, 309). Judge J e'PP'SOn 
then ignored the p~rorvisions o£ Rule 63:(1b), and instead 
of certifying a corpy o.f the affidavit to another judge 
to ~determine its legal sufficiency, as. required by the ru1e, 
he reviewed the affidavit himself ·and lteld it insufficient 
i 
because (1) it did not show the 'availability of anorther 
judge to handle, the matter ('2) because of exp.ense to the 
~County (3) and beeause nothing app·eared in the affi-
·davit which eoruld not have p1reviously been called to the 
Court's attention, and (4): heeause the ap~plication of Rule 
·6·3-(ih) would not ibe feas:Lhle and would work injustices 
under Ruie: t(h). Whereupon the motion for disqualifica-
tion of judge· was denie·d (Tr. 460). 'The right to dis-
qualify the judge is not subject ·to any su:ch limitations as 
those rup~plied hy Judge Jep~pson. 
'The p~rejudice of the court ap~p~eared again from time 
to time during the trial. During the op~ening statements 
of counsel for defendants, counsel was summarizing what 
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the evidenee would show and was a:bout to mention the 
amount of plaintiff's prayer for damages when the ~ourt 
I 
not only stopped counsel and refused to permit him to 
mention the amount of plaintiff's prayer, but criticized 
counsel in the p:resence of the jury for attemp~ting to 
mention the amount prayed for ('Tr. 530). 
Further incidents during the trial indicated the p~rej­
udice of the -court. Mr. Flint had been testifying to 
various conversations, to which no objection had been 
made. At a point in his testimony Mr. Rofberts made an 
objection and the court made the following comment: 
''The motion is granted. As given, his testi-
mony in most cases has not heen in the line of con-
versation. It has been mostly in the way of con-
clusions. There has not heen objerction heretofore, 
but now that objections have starte·d you better 
caution the witness to fbe sure his testimony is 
different to iwhat it has 'been." 
Mr. Gustin who was examinin·g the witness rep1ied: 
"I ap~pre'ciate your Honor''s suggestion and 
your Honor's assistance.'' (T'r. 1852, 1853). 
At another place in Mr. Flint's testimony, upon dh-
jection of Plaintiff's ~ounsel the court said: 
I 
"The motion is granted. Mr. Flint, the court 
does not want to caution you again to confine that 
to conversation.'' (Tr. 1855). 
During the trial of the case it develop~ed that one of 
the jurors was not ~a qualified juror. Following that 'dis-
covery the defendants moved th·e court for an order of 
mistrial. While the Judge wa;s [considering his ruling 
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upon that motion he asked counsel for defendants if 
they would renew their motion to disqualify him if a mis-
trial were grante·d and a new trial ordered. Counsel for 
defendants inro:vmed the Judge that such motion would 
he renewed in the event of a new trial. Judge Jeppson 
then denied the motion for mistrial ('Tr. 1248, .1t249, 
1257). 
Plaintiff's case was without me-rit. It was not estaJh-
lished by clear and convincing evidence and the order 
setting aside the verdict as to these app1ellants was an 
abuse of dis'cretion and heyond the power of the trial 
court. 
WHEREF:O.RE, it is respectfully submitted that 
the order complained of he reversed, and the· verdict of 
the jury be reinstated. 
H.ARL:EY W. GUS!TIN 
HAROLD R. BOYER 
Atto.rneys for Flint Distribut-
ing C ompam.y a'11)d LeloJn.d B. 
Fliwt 
DELBERT M. DRAPER 
Attorney for E. M. Boyle 
c~ompany, Incorporated 
GORD·O~N B. CHRIS'TEN1SON 
A·ttorney for Robert N evim.s 
P~UL H. RAY 
·S. J. QUINNEY 
ALBERT R. B·O·WEN 
A~ttorneys for Ree,d Bigelow 
arnd The Raris C ompa'YII!J 
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